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A SHEEP IN WOLF'S CLOTHING: WHY THE
DEBATE SURROUNDING COMPARATIVE
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW IS SPECTACULARLY
ORDINARY
Matthew S. Raalf*
INTRODUCTION
In the summer of 2003, the U.S. Supreme Court took a step in
expanding its substantive due process jurisprudence. In so doing, it
also added to the debate surrounding the use of comparative
constitutional law in constitutional interpretation. In Lawrence v.
Texas' the Court overruled Bowers v. Hardwick2 and held that the
"vital interests in liberty and privacy"3 derived from the Fourteenth
Amendment of the U.S. Constitution4 extend to homosexuals
engaging in consensual sexual conduct.' Justice Kennedy, writing for
the majority, stated:
Of even more importance, almost five years before Bowers was
decided the European Court of Human Rights considered a case
with parallels to Bowers and to today's case. An adult male resident
in Northern Ireland alleged he was a practicing homosexual who
desired to engage in consensual homosexual conduct. The laws of
Northern Ireland forbade him that right. He alleged that he had
been questioned, his home had been searched, and he feared
criminal prosecution. The court held that the laws proscribing the
* J.D. Candidate, 2005, Fordham University School of Law. Thank you to my family
and friends for their endless support. Thank you also to Professor James Fleming for
suggesting the topic of comparative law and for always making time when he had very
little.
1. 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
2. 478 U.S. 186, 190-91 (1986) (declining to extend the Court's privacy
jurisprudence to include a right of homosexuals to engage in sodomy).
3. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 564.
4. See U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1 (reading in pertinent part "nor shall any State
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law").
5. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578-79. An in-depth discussion of the implications of
Lawrence to the law of privacy is beyond the scope of this Note. For an extended
discussion, see generally Randy E. Barnett, Justice Kennedy's Libertarian Revolution:
Lawrence v. Texas, 2002-2003 Cato Sup. Ct. Rev. 21; James E. Fleming, Lawrence's
Republic, 39 Tulsa L. Rev. 563 (2004); and Cass R. Sunstein, What Did Lawrence
Hold? Of Autonomy, Desuetude, Sexuality, and Marriage, 2003 Sup. Ct. Rev. 27
(2003).
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conduct were invalid under the European Convention on Human
Rights.... Authoritative in all countries that are members of the
Council of Europe (21 nations [in 1981], 45 nations now), the
decision is at odds with the premise in Bowers that the claim put
forward was insubstantial in our Western civilization.6
Justice Kennedy's choice to cite to "Western civilization" was not
unprecedented, nor particularly uncommon.7 Even in the specific
area of substantive due process, precedent exists for references to
foreign practice.8 But, as prevalent as the use of these materials is the
disagreement about their relevance among judges and scholars.' One
only needs to turn fifteen pages within the Lawrence opinion to see
this unrest come to life in Justice Scalia's dissent:
Much less do [constitutional rights] spring into existence, as the
court seems to believe, because foreign nations decriminalize
conduct. The Bowers majority opinion never relied on "values we
share with a wider civilization,".., but rather rejected the claimed
right to sodomy on the ground that such a right was not "deeply
rooted in this Nation's history"... The Court's discussion of these
foreign views.., is therefore meaningless dicta ... since "this Court
... should not impose foreign moods, fads, or fashions on
Americans." 0
This split within the Court illustrates quite aptly the status of the
debate about comparative materials in U.S. constitutional
jurisprudence. America's commentators have engaged in a thoughtful
debate that provides a poignant reply for each significant point." This
discourse, focused on whether comparative materials should be used
in domestic constitutional jurisprudence, does not receive further
comment here. Instead, this Note examines a situation of which
Lawrence is the most recent reminder. Unanimously accepted or not,
and with or without a legitimate foundation in American legal
tradition, comparative materials have been cited in domestic
6. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 573 (emphasis added) (citing Dudgeon v. United
Kingdom, 3 Eur. Ct. H.R. 40 (1981)).
7. At least one recent commentator indicates that such usage remains scarce. See,
e.g., Sarah K. Harding, Comparative Reasoning and Judicial Review, 28 Yale J. Int'l L.
409, 413-23 (2003) (comparing the attitudes of the Supreme Courts of the United
States and Canada with respect to foreign materials in constitutional decisions).
However, especially recently, the frequency seems to be increasing. For several
examples of the United States Supreme Court making comparative references, see
infra Part I.C. Furthermore, such references have appeared in the lower federal
courts. See Chen v. Ashcroft, 381 F.3d 221, 230-31 (3d Cir. 2004).
8. See Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 734 (1997) (discussing the
experience of the Netherlands in assessing the state's interest in regulating assisted
suicide). The decision also referred to a similar debate in other countries. Id. at 718
n.16.
9. See infra Part I.D.
10. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 598 (quoting Foster v. Florida, 537 U.S. 990, 990 n.
(2002) (Thomas, J., concurring in denial of certiorari)).
11. For further discussion of this debate, see infra Part I.B.
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decisions.12 Accordingly, this Note goes past the threshold debate
about whether comparative materials should be used, and instead,
compares the usage of such materials to other, more settled methods
of constitutional adjudication to come to a better understanding of
how comparative materials are used.
Part I of this Note examines typical uses of comparative materials in
other constitutional democracies, and then outlines the main points in
the domestic debate which, up to this point, has burdened their
incorporation into American jurisprudence. This part then notes both
the arrival of comparative materials in domestic jurisprudence and the
illusory role they currently seem to play. In light of the arrival of
comparative materials on the landscape of American jurisprudence,
Part II discusses the recurring conflict between interpretivism and
supplementation in constitutional interpretation, and assesses the
common arguments from both sides regarding methods of
constitutional interpretation. Part III contextualizes comparative
materials, viewing them in light of the existing methods of
constitutional jurisprudence discussed in Part II, and illustrates that
while there may be right and wrong answers to legal issues,
comparative materials cannot be considered "wrong" while other
well-settled methods are considered "right."13
I. THE NEW AMERICAN ANOMALY
This part aims to reformulate the distinction between the global
comparative discourse and American participation (or lack thereof).
Rather than usage versus silence, the distinction can more aptly be
12. The U.S. Supreme Court lags far behind the rest of the world in the overall
use of comparative materials. See infra Part I.A. However the list of instances in the
U.S. Supreme Court's jurisprudence is not quite as meager as some commentators
have tried to suggest. See, e.g., Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 316-17 n.21 (2002)
(citing "the world community" to help support the notion that mentally retarded
offenders should not be executed); Knight v. Florida, 528 U.S. 990, 995-97 (1999)
(Breyer, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari) (discussing Canada, the European
Convention on Human Rights, the United Nations Human Rights Committee,
Jamaica, and India to help support his assertion that the Court ought to address the
topic of undue delays on death row); Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 976-78
(1997) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (discussing the tension between centralized
governments and local control in Switzerland, Germany, and the European Union);
Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 718 n.16 (1997) (noting that Canada, Great
Britain, New Zealand, and Australia are all "embroiled in similar debates" regarding
physician-assisted suicide); New York v. United States, 326 U.S. 572, 583 n.5 (1946)
(discussing Canada, Australia, and Brazil to support its decision regarding Congress's
taxation of the states). Despite these examples, at least one commentator observes
that comparative references "continue to be few and far between." Harding, supra
note 7, at 419.
13. Cf Mark A. Lemley & Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech and Injunctions in
Intellectual Property Cases, 48 Duke L.J. 147, 147-98 (1998) (using a similar style of
analysis to show the reader that prior restraints may have no stronger justification in
copyright than in other areas of protected speech).
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described as usage versus somewhat illusory usage. Part I.A discusses
the global usage of comparative materials as a point of comparison
with domestic usage. Part I.B presents the debate that has surrounded
the use of comparative materials in domestic constitutional
jurisprudence. Part I.C then mentions several U.S. Supreme Court
cases in which comparative materials were used. Finally, Part I.D
examines the tentative manner in which the court and commentators
have approached comparative materials.
A. The Global Discourse
The extensive use of comparative materials in foreign tribunals adds
a new dimension to constitutional adjudication around the world. 4
One of the best examples of the breadth of the developing global
discourse exists close to home. The Supreme Court of Canada
"consistently looks to the law of other nations for guidance and
inspiration."' 5  And in virtually all foreign countries comparative
references are made by "borrowing from, responding to, or otherwise
interacting substantially with external sources of law, including foreign
sources that do not fit directly into the home system's formal
hierarchy of positive legal norms."' 6  While at times American
references to comparative materials are even more tentative and
cursory than Justice Kennedy's in Lawrence,1 7 foreign courts do "not
merely cite th[ese] foreign cases in a passing, pro forma way, but
14. See, e.g., Paolo G. Carozza, "My Friend is a Stranger": The Death Penalty and
the Global Ius Commune of Human Rights, 81 Tex. L. Rev. 1031 (2003) (discussing
the development and depth of global discourse in the area of human rights); Sujit
Choudhry, Globalization in Search of Justification: Toward a Theory of Comparative
Constitutional Interpretation, 74 Ind. L.J. 819 (1999) (discussing various ways in which
foreign courts tend to justify participation in comparative constitutional law). In the
area of capital punishment alone, a great number of international cases have used
comparative materials. See, e.g., Alkotomanybirosag [Hungarian Constitutional
Court], Dec. No. 23/1990 (X.31) AB (Oct. 24, 1990), translated in 1 E. Eur. Case Rep.
Const. L. 177 (1994) (Hungary); Bachan Singh v. Punjab (1983) 1 S.C.R. 145 (India);
Lithuanian Constitutional Court, Case no. 2/98 (Dec. 9, 1998), available at
http://www.lrkt.lt/doc-links/main.htm; Public Prosecutor v. Lau Kee Hoo, (1983)
M.L.J. 157 (Malay. Fed. Ct. 1982) (Malaysia) (citing and discussing Punjab, among
others, including foreign cases); State v. Makwanyane, 1995 (3) SALR 391 (CC)
(South Africa); Republic v. Mbushuu, (1994) T.L.R. 146 (Tanzan. High Ct.)
(Tanzania).
15. Harding, supra note 7, at 411. Harding points out that between 1984 and 1994,
23% of all cases cited by the Supreme Court of Canada were foreign. Id. at 416. For
examples of these cases, see Morgentaler v. The Queen, [1988] S.C.R. 30, and The
Queen v. Keegstra, [1990] S.C.R. 697, both of which discuss large areas of U.S.
constitutional doctrine.
16. Carozza, supra note 14, at 1045. For a sampling of cases which engage in
dialogue with foreign materials in this manner, see supra notes 14-15.
17. See supra note 6 and accompanying text. For instance, in Atkins, Justice
Stevens buried his very cursory reference to comparative materials within a long
footnote, and referred to "the world community" instead of citing any specific
authority. 536 U.S. at 316 n.21.
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instead engage[] their substantive reasoning and judgments."18 Even
Great Britain seems to have relaxed its constitutional isolation faster
than the United States. 9
Contrary to American practice, in other countries comparative
decisions are cited, discussed at length, and ultimately rejected or used
as persuasive reasoning for a similar result.2° One such example is the
Supreme Court of Nigeria addressing the constitutionality of capital
punishment in Kalu v. State.2' In Kalu, the court looked at several
international capital punishment cases, eventually dividing them into
two categories: those which recognized a qualified right to life, and
others which recognized an absolute right to life.22 After concluding
that Nigeria's constitutional provision had more in common with the
qualified rights, the court upheld the constitutionality of capital
punishment in Nigeria.23  Another example comes from an opinion
which is "undoubtedly one of the more extraordinary judicial opinions
regarding the death penalty ever written. '24 Justice P.N. Baghwati of
the Supreme Court of India, in Bachan Singh v. Punjab,25 so
extensively dissected the results and rationales of a wide variety of
foreign sources, that his dissent was not released until two years after
the court had announced its decision.26  He did not simply make
18. Carozza, supra note 14, at 1034. For specific examples of such foreign case
law, see infra note 20.
19. Harding, supra note 7, at 416-17. At least one commentator regards the
United States and England as having very similar attitudes toward foreign law. See H.
Patrick Glen, Persuasive Authority, 32 McGill L.J. 261, 283-84 (1987).
20. See, e.g., Bachan Singh v. Punjab (1983) 1 S.C.R. 145, 312-21 (India)
(Baghwati, J., dissenting); Lithuanian Constitutional Court, Case no. 2/98 (Dec. 9,
1998), available at http://www.lrkt.lt/doc links/main.htm; Public Prosecutor v. Lau
Kee Hoo, (1983) M.L.J. 157, 159-60 (Malay. Fed. Ct. 1982) (Malaysia) (citing and
discussing Punjab, among other cases, including United States case law); State v.
Makwanyane, 1995 (3) SALR 391, 415-41 (CC) (South Africa); Republic v. Mbushuu,
(1994) T.L.R. 146, 156-57 (High Ct.) (Tanzania). In fact, at least one of these courts
went beyond thorough and respectful treatment of foreign persuasive authority, to
the point of showing deference to a foreign tribunal. A Tanzanian court of appeals
wrote: "We agree with the learned Trial Judge... that court decisions of other
countries provide valuable information and guidance in interpreting the basic human
rights in our Constitution. That is what we have done following Furman v[.] Georgia,
in finding that the death penalty is inhuman, cruel, and degrading punishment."
Mbushuu v. Republic, [1995] T.L.R. 97, 116 (Ct. App.) (Tanz.) (emphasis added)
(citing Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972)). For a discussion of the U.S.
Supreme Court's approach, by contrast, see infra Part I.D.1.
21. See Carozza, supra note 14, at 1061-62 (citing Kalu v. State, (1998) 12 S.C.N.J.
1 (Nig.) (Nigeria)).
22. See id. at 1062 (finding qualified rights to life in Tanzania, Zimbabwe, India,
the United States, and Jamaica, but finding the rights to life in South Africa and
Hungary to be absolute).
23. See id.
24. Id. at 1047.
25. (1983) 1 S.C.R. at 145.
26. See Carozza, supra note 14, at 1047-50. In fact, the long delay resulted from
the fact that Justice Baghwati drew from an incredible range of materials that
undeniably included comparative materials. Notably, the majority had also used
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references to other nations, but instead he discussed at length and
responded to the arguments and observations raised elsewhere.27
Strikingly (from the United States' perspective), these in-depth and
deferential examinations of comparative materials are normally
conducted without self-assuring references to the superior
authoritativeness of local law.28
The key distinction is not that other countries engage in
comparative constitutional practice and the United States does not.29
While this phenomenon is still a significant difference, whether
foreign materials are used might soon become a subordinate issue to
how they are used.3" The above examples of comparativism are
accepted within the global community,31 and it is the length and
richness of the discussion, and the perceived degree of deference
given to the comparative materials, that would be most atypical and
controversial in a U.S. Supreme Court opinion.32 Part I.B briefly
outlines some common arguments made within the context of this
controversy.
comparative materials in its decision (unlike the asymmetry in Lawrence) but
Baghwati went into far greater detail in using them. See Punjab, (1983) 1 S.C.R. at
256-371.
27. Carozza, supra note 14, at 1049; see also Punjab, (1983) 1 S.C.R. at 312-21.
28. See Carozza, supra note 14, at 1083 (observing, after conducting a wide survey
of many foreign cases, that only two constitutional courts (Nigeria and Tanzania)
asserted the superiority of local law, and even in those cases, "the judges made
significant efforts to acknowledge and discuss foreign norms").
29. This assertion may have been a point of contention several years ago. It seems
that this is still a difficult perception to shed. A few commentators continue to
evaluate this difference in quantitative terms, suggesting that the key distinction lies
in sheer numbers. See Harding supra note 7, at 418-20 (expressing the main difference
between the Supreme Courts of the United States and Canada in numbers as well as
through in-depth discussion of the foreign sources). But see supra note 12; infra Part
I.C. (both providing examples of comparative references by the U.S. Supreme Court).
30. See Carozza, supra note 14, at 1032-36 (noting that as of yet, the United States
is missing out on the richness of the global judicial discussion in the area of human
rights, despite instances of mentioning foreign sources in passing). See generally David
Fontana, Refined Comparativism in Constitutional Law, 49 UCLA L. Rev. 539 (2001)
(arguing that comparative materials ought to be used in a manner he describes as
"refined comparativism").
31. See also William A. Schabas, The Death Penalty As Cruel Treatment and
Torture (1996) (noting that there is now a multinational body of comparative law on
the death penalty). See generally Bruce Ackerman, The Rise of World
Constitutionalism, 83 Va. L. Rev. 771 (1997).
32. It can be easily predicted at the very least that Justice Scalia would have
reacted with even more hostility had Justice Kennedy gone to great lengths to
uncover the European Court's rationale and adopt it in the majority opinion. See
supra note 10 and accompanying text. Along with his dissent in Lawrence, Justice
Scalia has consistently objected to the use of comparative materials on the few
occasions when they have been used. See, e.g., Atkins v. Virginia 536 U.S. 304, 324-25
(2002) (joining Chief Justice Rehnquist); Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 921
n.11 (1997); Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 369 n.1 (1989).
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B. The Domestic "Threshold" Debate
1. The Threshold Objections to Using Comparative Materials
The threshold debate about comparative materials seems to be cut
along very predictable and very familiar lines.33 One commentator
has observed that "[o]riginalism and textualism are particularly
incompatible with comparative analysis, 34 because comparativism
necessarily looks beyond the text and original intent. Thus, objections
to the use of comparative materials have originalist or positivist
flavors, while the responses tend to sound in competing theories of
interpretation like living constitutionalism.35 The related concerns of
exceptionalism and particularism36 contain both normative and
pragmatic concerns about the use of comparative materials which
provide the basis for objection. These two concepts and the
arguments derived from them will now be addressed in turn, followed
by some common responses.
a. Exceptionalism
Exceptionalism can be defined by the assertion that "the United
States Constitution is unique and that the experience surrounding it is
unique."37  Implied in this definition is the belief that exclusively
domestic sources should be used to interpret the Constitution.
Reference to other nations, for the exceptionalist, contradicts this
33. For further discussion of the lines which are alluded to here, see infra notes
160-65 and accompanying text (discussing the difference between interpretivists and
supplementors), and infra Parts II.A-D (applying the arguments of each school of
thought to several methods of constitutional interpretation).
34. Louis J. Blum, Mixed Signals: The Limited Role of Comparative Analysis in
Constitutional Adjudication, 39 San Diego L. Rev. 157, 162 (2002). Original intent
and text are the interpretivists' primary methods of interpretation. See infra notes
162-63 and accompanying text.
35. See infra Part I.B.2 (discussing some of the responses to these threshold
objections). For an illustration of the concept of living constitutionalism, see
generally William J. Brennan, Jr., The Constitution of the United States:
Contemporary Ratification, 27 S. Tex. L. Rev. 433 (1986).
36. Though different terminology seems to be repeatedly used, these are the two
terms which tend to be used to describe these concepts. See Blum, supra note 34, at
163 (noting that the two concepts are very similar); James E. Fleming, We the
Exceptional American People, 11 Const. Comment. 355, 355-56 (1994) (discussing
exceptionalism); Fontana, supra note 30, at 616-18 (discussing particularism); see also
Mark Tushnet, The Possibilities of Comparative Constitutional Law, 108 Yale L.J.
1225 (1999) (not using the same terms, but clearly describing the same concepts as the
main lines of objection to the use of comparative materials).
37. Blum, supra note 34, at 163. This characteristic has been observed by other
commentators as well. See, e.g., Mark Tushnet, Taking the Constitution Away from
the Courts 181-82, 188-93 (1999) (characterizing the U.S. Constitution as an
expression of national character); Harding, supra note 7, at 421 (not using the term
exceptionalism but discussing the prevailing American attitudes which could be
explained only by the belief that the American Constitution is unique).
2004] 1245
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belief.3" To many, "allegiance to the Constitution and a certain kind
of respect for the Founding, and for crucial episodes in our history,
are central to what it means to be an American. '39  Comparative
constitutionalism breaks this allegiance and offends exceptionalist
values.4°
By and large, the Supreme Court has cooperated with
exceptionalists. Professor Sarah Harding contends that "[d]espite the
fact that a few U.S. Supreme Court Justices have expressed interest in
comparative judicial reasoning, the Court as a whole has so far
hesitated to move in that direction. '41 This reluctance might be based
in part on an "enforcement" model of constitutional adjudication
rather than a "dialogical" model.42 According to Professor Harding, a
dialogical court, such as the Supreme Court of Canada, looks for its
lower courts to engage it in an ongoing legal conversation, while an
enforcement-oriented high court is constantly seeking to re-assert its
unilateral control over the law of the land.43 Put into the comparative
context, if the U.S. Constitution is uniquely American, and the
Supreme Court of the United States is its sole "enforcer," then it
follows that the Court would seek to "establish a monopoly on
constitutional interpretation.""' In the first instance, this tendency
38. See Blum, supra note 34, at 162-63. Blum names exceptionalism as one of the
"significant objections to comparative analysis in constitutional adjudication," but
then gives no particular reason why. Id. at 162. However the very definition that "the
United States Constitution is unique and that the experience surrounding it is
unique," would seem to indicate that the exceptionalist would be offended by the
mere presence of comparative materials, because to conform to the interpretation of a
foreign tribunal would challenge this sense of uniqueness. See Bruce Ackerman, We
the People: Foundations 3 n.12 (1991) (expressing his opinion that the United States
should no longer allow European influence to help define its Constitution); Michael
Kammen, The United States Constitution, Public Opinion, and the Problem of
American Exceptionalism, in The United States Constitution: Roots, Rights and
Responsibilities 267 (A.E. Dick Howard ed., 1992) (agreeing with a tradition of
American exceptionalism).
39. David A. Strauss, Common Law, Common Ground, and Jefferson's Principle,
112 Yale L.J. 1717, 1719 (2003).
40. See generally Ackerman, supra note 38 (attributing the vitality of the
American constitutional tradition to American exceptionalism which helps lead to the
conclusion that the exceptionalist sustains a fundamental discomfort when
interpretive borders are breached).
41. Harding, supra note 7, at 423.
42. For a comparison of the Supreme Courts of the United States (which is
identified as embodying the enforcement model) and Canada (which is identified as
embodying the dialogical model), see id. at 423-51.
43. See id.
44. Id. at 450. Harding argues that the U.S. Supreme Court seeks to limit any
outside influence by limiting possible sources of constitutional interpretation, whether
they are foreign or domestic: "In short, ensuring coherence through the limiting of
sources and participants, rather than persuasion through dialogue, is at the heart of
the U.S. Supreme Court's approach to judicial review." Id. at 451; see also Larry D.
Kramer, Foreword: We the Court, 115 Harv. L. Rev. 4, 14 (2001) ( "The Rehnquist
Court no longer views itself as first among equals, but has instead staked its claim to
being the only institution empowered to speak with authority when it comes to the
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pertains to the Court's relationship with domestic authority when it
comes to interpreting the Constitution,45 but it is not a great leap for
Professor Harding to suggest that the "refusal to engage foreign legal
systems arguably stems from similar concerns about maintaining a
tight grip on authority."46 After all, if some Justices are unwilling to
trust other American institutions (including lower courts) to
contribute to constitutional interpretation, then they likely would be
even more reluctant to trust foreign sources.47 With the institutional
self-image of the court limiting the amount and character of materials
it is willing to consider,48 combined with the exceptionalistic concerns
put forth by some,49 the resistance that comparative materials have
faced seems understandable.
While it is easy to identify the exceptionalist's objection to
comparative constitutional methodology in the normative sense, their
objections to its use might leave more pragmatically oriented
proponents unconvinced without practical concerns to animate a more
concrete fear: that comparative materials will lead to wrong answers.
Exceptionalists base their pragmatic criticisms on the idea that it is
impossible to accurately measure and account for the inevitable
variations between legal systems.5" While modern constitutional
meaning of the Constitution."). By contrast, Professor Harding argues that the
Supreme Court of Canada does not seek to monopolize the final authority on
constitutional issues, and therefore has no reservations about engaging in dialogue
with other domestic sources, as well as the constitutional analysis of other nations.
Harding, supra note 7, at 423-39.
45. The Court, in interacting with other domestic bodies, seeks primarily to
establish authority. It
views itself not as a mediator or partner in an active dialogue but rather as a
local law enforcer in the strictest sense. Through direct assertions of
authority over both legislative bodies and lower courts, the Court has
established itself as very much the final.., exclusive authority in
constitutional interpretation.
Harding, supra note 7, at 451.
46. Id.
47. At least one commentator seems convinced that the Court turns to its own
precedent more than any other source to solve constitutional questions. See generally
David A. Strauss, Common Law Constitutional Interpretation, 63 U. Chi. L. Rev. 877
(1996); David A. Strauss, Freedom of Speech and the Common-Law Constitution, in
Eternally Vigilant: Free Speech in the Modern Era 32 (Lee C. Bollinger & Geoffrey
R. Stone eds., 2002); David A. Strauss, The Irrelevance of Constitutional Amendments,
114 Harv. L. Rev. 1457 (2001). For a discussion of the common law method of
interpretation, see infra Part II.C.
48. See supra notes 44-47 and accompanying text.
49. See supra notes 37-40 and accompanying text.
50. See, e.g., Daniel H. Foote, The Roles of Comparative Law: Inaugural Lecture
for the Dan Fenno Henderson Professorship in East Asian Legal Studies, 73 Wash. L.
Rev. 25, 36 (1998); J.H.H. Weiler & Joel P. Trachtman, European Constitutionalism
and its Discontents, 17 Nw. J. Int'l. L. & Bus. 354, 355 (1997). "Direct borrowing or
transplantation of legal solutions or doctrines will, in the opinion of many legal
scholars, be severely impacted by fundamental cultural and social differences." Blum,
supra note 34, at 163. Blum notes that other critics could counter this contention by
claiming that basic constitutional problems are similar enough so that borrowing
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democracies tend to be similar, critics in the United States complain
that "[i]dentifying common functions across constitutional systems is
always problematic because doing so inevitably omits institutional
details unique to the systems being compared."5
First, the transplantation problem leads to the worry that perceived
similarity can be misleading, so that problems can arise when the
constitutional texts are nearly the same, or even identical.52 Language
in many modern constitutions is derived from the U.S. Constitution,
so similarities are fairly common. 3 However, the exceptionalist can
argue that much of the meaning behind these words frequently
develops well after their drafting and in the context of a particular
society.54  This norm of constitutional interpretation creates a
funhouse-mirror lens through which comparative materials must be
viewed. It is quite possible that two very similar terms found in
different constitutions have taken shape in very different ways. 6 In
solutions or at least rationale is not particularly problematic. Id. at 164: see also David
Beatty, Constitutional Law in Theory and Practice 10 (1995) (arguing that principles
of constitutional law are "the same around the world"). For further discussion, see
infra notes 105-07 and accompanying text; infra Part III.B.1 (discussing the
transplantation problem of comparative materials relative to similar problems of
other methods).
51. Tushnet, supra note 36, at 1239.
52. See Choudhry, supra note 14, at 830 (using the example of China, which uses
words like rights and liberties in its Constitution, but pointing out that it may very
well be using them differently).
53. See Harding, supra note 7, at 414 n.25 (asserting that "the influence of the
United States Bill of Rights is certainly apparent in the Canadian Charter [of Rights
and Freedoms]"). For instance, the Canadian Charter guarantees freedoms of
religion, expression, press and the media, assembly, association, livelihood, life,
liberty, security of person, security from search and seizure, illegal detentions, from
cruel and unusual punishment, from self-incrimination, and a due process equivalent
which assures principles of fundamental justice. See Can Const. (Constitution Act,
1982) pt. I (Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms), §§ 2-12.
54. For instance, the freedom of speech promised in the U.S. Constitution was still
being defined almost two hundred years after the clause was drafted. See Miller v.
California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973); Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969); N.Y. Times
Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964); see also Walter F. Murphy et al., American
Constitutional Interpretation 5 (3rd ed. 2003) ("Moreover, a constitutional text may
appear to be, or indeed be, quite different after interpretation from what it was
before.").
55. Professor James Fleming uses the metaphor of a mirror when U.S. interpreters
look to certain other constitutions. See Fleming, supra note 36, at 365 (using Germany
and Japan as examples). A commentator arguing the transplantation problem might
be inclined to build on this metaphor by calling it a funhouse mirror to account for the
distortion.
56. The work of some comparative legal scholars includes emphasis on difference
where there appears to be none. See, e.g., William P. Alford, On the Limits of "Grand
Theory" in Comparative Law, 61 Wash. L. Rev. 945, 954 (1986) (discussing his
hypothesis that words familiar to the U.S. Constitution found in the Chinese
Constitution may mean different things because of their respective cultural contexts).
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such a case, one of the two nations borrowing from the other may fall
victim to a false sense of applicability. 7
Of course, there is also the problem of obvious differences. The
exceptionalist would argue that a comparativist needs to make the
claim that all differences are irrelevant in order to overcome the
transplantation problem.5" To produce a convincing theory as to why
an infinite list of possible variables is irrelevant would be a tedious
task. In doing so, one may begin to question whether the worth of
comparative materials does not outweigh their burden.5 9 And, even
assuming that it is possible to explain away the variables in some
cases, one commentator wonders if the endeavor would narrow the
range of appropriate situations for comparative materials to the point
where their use would probably be far less common than the status
quo.6" This Note next discusses particularism, which, although quite
similar to exceptionalism, leads to some distinct criticisms of
comparative materials.
b. Particularism
Legal particularism, as distinguished from exceptionalism, simply
says that constitutions are unique expressions of national identity or
character.6" While the exceptionalist claims that the American
Constitution is a unique expression of national character,
"[p]articularists claim that a constitution is defined by its people. 63
Other commentators have defined the relationship in reverse.
"Indeed, for some countries, constitutions are an integral component
of national identity, and reflect one way in which those nations view
themselves as different from others."' Whether a constitution defines
its people or the national identity defines a constitution, it is
important to note that particularistic attitudes cause considerable
57. See Choudhry, supra note 14, at 830 ("[It is beyond dispute that legal texts are
inherently ambiguous and require reference to extra-textual sources for their
interpretation and application in concrete cases.").
58. See Tushnet, supra note 36, at 1267 (describing a method to correct this
translation problem by generalizing away from case-specific peculiarities, then
admitting that this is also a troublesome endeavor).
59. See id. (noting that an account as to why certain variables are irrelevant is
rarely produced).
60. See id. at 1265 (noting that the number of cases where even a limited number
of variables are adequately accounted for will be small).
61. See Blum, supra note 34, at 163; Choudhry, supra note 14, at 830-32.
62. See supra note 37 and accompanying text.
63. Blum, supra note 34, at 163 (citing Choudhry, supra note 14, at 830-32).
64. Choudhry, supra note 14, at 822-23. Some particularists have asserted that
using comparative materials is a violation of the nature of American constitutional
law. See Alford, supra note 56, at 946-47; George P. Fletcher, Constitutional Identity,
14 Cardozo L. Rev. 737, 739 (1993); Frederick Schauer, Free Speech and the Cultural
Contingency of Constitutional Categories, 14 Cardozo L. Rev. 865, 877 (1993).
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normative discomfort with the use of comparative materials in a
manner which is much the same as exceptionalism.6 5
This subtle difference between the two concepts66 raises a different
pragmatic question. How can one asserting particularistic views
explain how the rest of the world's constitutional democracies have
engaged in such in-depth comparative constitutional discourse,' while
still asserting that a constitution is a unique expression of national
character? It is possible that most other nations do not think in
particularist terms and have no such fundamental discomfort with the
idea of other nations influencing their constitutional jurisprudence.68
However, this reply fails to satisfy the claim that all written
constitutions enjoy a unique relationship with their people. The more
satisfying answer has centered around the concept of a constitutional
"license"69 to use comparative materials. If the constitution of the
nation in question authorizes such use, then it can be argued that it is
the will of the people of that nation to look to the global community,
and the particularist should be satisfied.7" However, it is a rarity to
find a constitution which explicitly authorizes comparative
references.71 It is far more common to see formulations of what might
be called an implied authorization, as is done in the constitutions of
India and Canada.7" In much the same way as an American
65. Actually, the two concepts are so similar that a couple of commentators seem
to have expressed exceptionalist notions in particularist terms. See Choudhry, supra
note 14, at 832 (clearly collapsing the two concepts into one in stating "[a]rguably,
legal particularism accounts for the steadfast refusal of American courts to rely on
foreign case law when interpreting the United States Constitution"); see also Fontana,
supra note 30, at 615 (stating that a particularist, rather than an exceptionalist, argues
that the U.S. Constitution is uniquely American).
66. See supra text accompanying notes 62-63.
67. See supra Part I.A.
68. Development in the Law- International Criminal Law, The International
Judicial Dialogue: When Domestic Constitutional Courts Join the Conversation, 114
Harv. L. Rev. 2049, 2062-63 (2001) [hereinafter The International Judicial Dialogue]
(noting that many countries seem to engage in comparative analysis without much
reservation).
69. See Tushnet, supra note 36, at 1231; The International Judicial Dialogue, supra
note 68, at 2062-64.
70. The International Judicial Dialogue, supra note 68, at 2063-64 (suggesting that
the constitutional courts of Canada, Jamaica, India, and South Africa reflect general
global legal norms).
71. The South African Bill of Rights is one such rarity. See Carozza, supra note 14,
at 1056; Fontana, supra note 30, at 545. The interim constitution of 1993 provided as
follows:
In interpreting the provisions of this chapter a court of law shall promote the
values which underlie an open and democratic society based on freedom and
equality and shall, where applicable, have regard to public international law
applicable to the protection of the rights entrenched in this chapter, and may
have regard to comparable foreign case law.
State v. Makwanyane, 1995 (3) SALR 391, 413 (CC) (South Africa). The wording has
since been altered. See S. Afr. Const. ch. 2, § 39.
72. See, e.g., The International Judicial Dialogue, supra note 68, at 2063-64
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constitutional interpreter would go beyond the text and use an
original intent or custom argument, constitutional interpreters in these
countries assert that it is a part of the fabric of both the constitution
and culture of the particular nation to be involved in the global
discourse, with or without explicit textual authorization.73 This idea of
implied authorization may be helpful for the particularist since
"[m]ost of the world's constitutions were written, and most of its
constitutional courts were created, within the context of the
international constitutional dialogue,"74 while the particularist will
assert that U.S constitutional history was "developed and nurtured"
within an isolated and purely domestic tradition.75 Given that in the
U.S. Constitution there is no textual authorization and, according to
some scholars, relatively weak footing for implied authorization,76 a
particularist can argue that while the rich international discourse is
justified, so too is the general American abstention from it.77
2. The Responses to the Threshold Objections
There are two main responses to the normative discomfort
articulated in Part I.B.1. First, proponents of comparative materials
attack the normative attitudes of the critics by pointing out that
Americans may have changed what it means to be uniquely American.
(discussing the fact that most other constitutions were written within the context of a
greater global discourse, and therefore comparative constitutional law was easily
incorporated into the interpretation of these constitutions). For examples of these
implied authorizations at work, see Kindler v. Canada, [1991] 2 S.C.R. 779, 856
(Canada); Bachan Singh v. Punjab, (1983) 1 S.C.R. 145, 223-25 (India).
73. In fact, South Africa seems to fit this mold in addition to its textual license. In
much the same way as the countries which lack any specific text, South Africans
consider their constitution to have been ratified within this global community and,
therefore, to carry with it an international character. See The International Judicial
Dialogue, supra note 68, at 2063-64. The President of the South African Court,
Arthur Chaskalson, went so far as to say that international precedents would demand
attention even without the textual hook. See Makwanyane, 1995 (3) SA at 413.
74. The International Judicial Dialogue, supra note 68, at 2064 (further noting that
"[tihe Indian constitution (1949), the Jamaican constitution (1962), the Canadian
Charter of Rights and Freedoms (1982), and the South African Interim Constitution
(1993) were drafted largely by looking to foreign and international experience"); see
also Gerald L. Neuman, Human Rights and Constitutional Rights: Harmony and
Dissonance, 55 Stan. L. Rev. 1863, 1880 (2003) (pointing out in the context of human
rights that an international regime "now forms part of the context of national
constitutional regimes, which may make it necessary to reconsider institutional
analyses conducted at the national level in isolation").
75. The International Judicial Dialogue, supra note 68, at 2069-70. But see infra
note 76.
76. The American argument for an implied license may not be as weak as the
particularist might try to suggest. For further discussion, see infra notes 91-92 and
accompanying text.
77. See Tushnet, supra note 36, at 1229-30 (arguing that before the U.S. courts
engage in comparative constitutional law they need to look to other nations'
justifications for using it and articulate a justification of their own).
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One way that this point is articulated is through the notion of implied
constitutional amendments. 78 This notion asserts that during key eras
in American history, there were certain fundamental shifts in the way
the Constitution was perceived.79  While this theory was not
developed to justify the use of comparative constitutional law,80 it is
useful to illustrate that fundamental constitutional understandings can
and have changed by the will of the American people.8 ' By this logic,
exceptionalism and particularism and discomfort with the judicial use
of comparative materials can be uprooted as more Americans come to
believe that the U.S. Supreme Court ought to use comparative
materials. 2  It is possible that within a changing society,
comparativism "fits with other important trends in contemporary
American constitutional jurisprudence." 3 If this is so then at least the
normative concerns begin to quiet.
78. The notion of informal unwritten amendments suggests that society's
understanding of the Constitution (and its meaning), if not the text itself, can change
as society changes. See, e.g., Ackerman, supra note 38, at 22; Ronald Dworkin,
Freedom's Law 10 (1996) [hereinafter Dworkin, Freedom's Law]; Ronald Dworkin,
Law's Empire 254-59 (1986) [hereinafter Dworkin, Law's Empire]; Richard A. Fallon,
Jr., How to Choose a Constitutional Theory, 87 Cal. L. Rev. 535, 543 (1999).
79. See Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., Methods of Interpreting the Commerce Clause: A
Comparative Analysis, 55 Ark. L. Rev. 1185, 1207-08 (2003). In fact, American
constitutional law has been thought of as a "multigenerational project." Strauss,
supra note 39, at 1719; see also Neil Colman McCabe, "Our Federalism," Not Theirs:
Judicial Comparative Federalism in the U.S., 40 S. Tex. L. Rev. 541 (1999) (arguing
that there is no binding American principle of isolationism rooted into its legal
culture). Professor Neil Colman McCabe went so far as to call exceptionalist
sentiments "the kind of self-satisfied strutting that gives chauvinism a bad name." Id.
at 543 (quoting J.M. Balkin & Sanford Levinson, The Canons of Constitutional Law,
111 Harv. L. Rev. 963, 1005 n.134 (1998)).
80. Bruce Ackerman developed this theory as a way of understanding modern
constitutional law through his notion of a dualistic democracy. See Ackerman, supra
note 38; Bruce Ackerman, We the People: Transformations (1998).
81. Justice William Brennan was a proponent of this view, often called "living
constitutionalism." See Brennan, supra note 35; see also Charles L. Black Jr., Further
Reflections on the Constitutional Justice of Livelihood, 86 Colum. L. Rev. 1103, 1115-
17 (1986) (discussing an analogous progression of philosophy on the Court in the
context of the incorporation of the First Amendment, and urging future generations
to pursue the same changes by being "a vise that can handle the big beams"). The
foremost opponent on the court, Justice Scalia, has asserted that most of the court has
turned to living constitutionalism, and therefore the Constitution has become
somewhat pliable. See Antonin Scalia, A Matter of Interpretation: Federal Courts
and the Law 39-40 (1997).
82. It is becoming difficult to find recent literature which supports Justice Scalia's
dissenting view in Lawrence. See supra note 10 and accompanying text. The most
recent commentators seem to support the notion that comparative materials could be
useful. For instance, David Fontana states that the U.S. Supreme Court "must enter
the new century with a willingness to deal with a rapidly changing world." Fontana,
supra note 30, at 622. He further notes that other nations "are developing
sophisticated judicial systems with talented judges who write cogent and compelling
opinions." Id.; see Tushnet, supra note 36 (posing and attempting to answer the
question of how to learn from comparative materials).
83. Fontana, supra note 30, at 570.
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In addition to abstract notions of implied amendments, some
supporters of comparative materials cite the increasing diversity
among the American public as a reason to believe that they no longer
harbor exceptionalistic or particularistic attitudes.84  A similar
argument suggests that many Americans feel at least as connected to
the current constitutional courts of other nations, as they do to the
founders of this nation. According to Professor David Strauss,
"[r]elatively few people alive today are even descended from the
people who participated in the great constitutional decisions of the
past." 6 This, in light of the long way American society and the world
as a whole have come since the eighteenth century, provides
advocates of comparativism another reason to believe that the
normative objections to comparative materials are going the way of
the dinosaur.87
A second criticism of the normative concerns with comparativism is
that far from being a recipe for constitutional disaster, differences may
actually be useful.8 Comparative materials can be used to gain
perspective and provide a check on deviations from contemporary
values and morals which are to guide the Court's decision.89 It has
been argued that uniqueness, which is relied upon so centrally by both
84. See id. at 622 (pointing out that America is becoming more and more
multicultural); Strauss, supra note 39, at 1723-24 (noting a gradual detachment from
the founding generation as time continues to pass). In light of the United States' rich
and still expanding diversity, one might wonder if so many Americans would
experience such severe discomfort with comparative materials, the fear of which has
continued to hold them back. See Fontana, supra note 30, at 622 (suggesting that
American constitutional law needs to deal with changes such as multiculturalism and
that therefore comparativism is an appropriate measure).
85. See Strauss, supra note 39, at 1723-24.
86. Id. at 1724.
87. Professor Strauss argues that adherence to the Constitution and its
interpretation should be justified and thought of in terms that "can appeal to any
reasonable member of our society today, even to people who reject the idea of
belonging to any American cultural or quasi-ethnic tradition." Id.; see also supra notes
78-83 and accompanying text.
88. See Choudhry, supra note 14, at 856-57. In fact, some nations which tend to
believe that their constitutions are unique still engage in the use of comparative
materials, without articulating a basis for some constitutional authorization, express
or otherwise, precisely because they are different. See Carozza, supra note 14
(discussing many nations which use comparative materials and various reasons for
doing so). In addition, despite its textual license, South Africa still maintains that its
constitution is unique and requires unique interpretation. See Du Plessis v. De Klerk,
1996 (3) SALR 850, 911 (CC) (South Africa) (asserting that "when all is said and
done, the answer to the question before us is to be sought. first and last, in our
Constitution"). The South African Constitutional Court engages in comparativism,
however, not only because of its textual license, see supra notes 70-71 and
accompanying text, but also on the theory that comparison does not undermine
difference, but in fact furthers it. See Choudhry, supra note 14, at 855-56.
89. In cases which call to value judgments, wise judges will "consider international
approaches ... to be an aid in correcting, or balancing, that inevitable subjectivity of
the judges that is due to their being situated in a specific historical and cultural
context." Carozza, supra note 14, at 1065.
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exceptionalists and particularists, relies on comparative materials
because the concept of difference is itself "defined in comparative
terms," and without them, a commitment to constitutional difference
would be impossible.90
While the preceding responses address the provincial attitudes of
exceptionalism and particularism, there are still pragmatic concerns to
overcome. With respect to particularism, there is the problem that the
U.S. Constitution does not seem to authorize the use of comparative
materials.9" With that notion in mind, at least one theorist has
attempted to formulate an implied authorization from the U.S.
Constitution.92 According to Professor Mark Tushnet, in the same
way as some other nations seem to, Americans could simply cite their
recognition of themselves as participants in a larger society to
authorize comparativism in domestic cases.93 However, this might be
unconvincing without a more mature switch in national philosophy.94
Instead, Tushnet bases implied authorization on a particular
interpreter's conception of the Constitution.95 But perhaps the most
convincing case for an implied license is made in the name of
90. Choudhry, supra note 14, at 857. As applied to constitutions, it follows that "a
constitution is only unique by comparison to other constitutions that share some
feature or characteristic which that constitution does not." Id. at 856 (using the
example of a general limitations clause in the Canadian Charter of Rights and
Freedoms, which was only different because it had not been done in other
constitutions). See Can. Const. (Constitution Act, 1982) pt. I (Canadian Charter of
Rights and Freedoms) § 1.
91. See supra notes 74-77 and accompanying text.
92. See Tushnet, supra note 36 (using the concepts of functionalism, expressivism,
and bricolage to provide such a license).
93. For further explanation of the idea that other nations relying on a self-
perception that they are participants in a global community to license the use of
comparative materials, see The International Judicial Dialogue, supra note 68, at 2062-
64. See, e.g., Kindler v. Canada, [1991] 2 S.C.R. 779, 856 (Can.) (liberally using
comparative materials without explicit authorization); Bachan Singh v. Punjab, (1983)
1 S.C.R. 145, 196-225 (India) (same); Pratt v. Attorney-General for Jamaica, [1994] 2
A.C. 1, 30-31 (P.C. 1993) (appeal taken from Jamaica) (same). Professor Tushnet, in
his discussion of expressionism, which views a constitution as a national expression
and sounds very akin to particularism as described in this Note, seems to suggest that
within such a theory, the very desire of a people to look to comparative materials
abroad is enough to license the same. See Tushnet, supra note 36, at 1269-85.
94. For a summary of the argument that isolationist views are dying out in
contemporary American society, see supra notes 78-87 and accompanying text.
95. See Tushnet, supra note 36, at 1238-1306. Another approach has been
observed in Justice Breyer's jurisprudence. Tushnet suggests that Justice Breyer
seems to believe the usage of comparative materials is authorized when more
fundamental methods of constitutional interpretation fail to settle a question. See id.
at 1233; see also Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 976-78 (1997) (Breyer, J.,
dissenting). Justice Breyer's approach seems to be that general interpretive methods
might provide a license when a doctrine (federalism, in this case) relies on something
(in this case, empirical judgments), that comparative materials provide relatively
conveniently.
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originalism.96 In Printz v. United States, Justice Scalia contended that
comparative analysis was "inappropriate to the task of interpreting a
constitution, though it was of course quite relevant to the task of
writing one."9 7 Supporters of comparativism can argue that he was
only half right, 9" because the Constitution demonstrates "a degree of
openness to international cooperation that was innovative for the
eighteenth century" as they drafted the Constitution.99 Contrary to
Justice Scalia's view, they argue that "[c]omparative constitutional
analysis by the Framers argues in favor of, not against, the same
analysis by later interpreters."'" Working with such a flexible
concept, an interpreter in the U.S. could sketch a plausible license to
use comparative materials.
The far more difficult and long-standing debate on the pragmatic
side has been the transplantation problem.1' One attempt to
overcome this is to argue that comparative materials may be used in
order to maintain a difference."°  This contention notices that
transplantation concerns erroneously assume that comparative
96. Because originalism licenses comparative materials on their critic's own turf, it
may be the best case for an American license. See supra note 34 and accompanying
text (mentioning that originalists tend to be those who object to comparative
materials). For a detailed discussion of the evidence for a constitutional license to use
comparative materials in the name of original intent and history, see Fontana, supra
note 30, at 574-591.
97. Printz, 521 U.S. at 921 n.11.
98. The second half of this assertion, that comparative materials were relevant to
writing the Constitution, is well supported. See, e.g., Bernard Bailyn, The Ideological
Origins of the American Revolution (1967) (same); Carl Becker, The Declaration of
Independence: A Study in the History of Political Ideas (Vintage Books 1958) (1922)
(same); Peter S. Onuf, The Origins of the Federal Republic: Jurisdictional
Controversies in the United States, 1775-1787 (1983) (same); Clinton Rossiter, 1787:
The Grand Convention (1966) (same); Gordon S. Wood, The Creation of the
American Republic, 1776-1787 (1969) (same); David A.J. Richards, Revolution and
Constitutionalism in America, 14 Cardozo L. Rev. 577, 584-86 (1993) (discussing the
comparative influence on the Founding Era). The first half of this assertion, however,
that comparative materials are irrelevant to subsequent interpretation, has been
questioned on original intent grounds. See, e.g., The Declaration of Independence
para. 1 (U.S. 1776) (speaking of a "decent respect to the opinions of mankind");
Fontana, supra note 30, at 579 (asserting that the evidence for Justice Scalia's
distinction is insufficient to suggest that the founders intended for comparative
references to cease at ratification).
99. Neuman, supra note 74, at 1899.
100. McCabe, supra note 79, at 544. He further notes that "[w]hen the Framers...
wished to ban a particular method of constitutional interpretation, they expressly said
so." Id. The Ninth Amendment is cited as an example, while it is noted that "It~he
Federalist Papers do not demonstrate any original intent of the Framers to ban
comparative constitutional analysis as a method of interpretation." Id. at 545.
101. See, e.g., Oscar G. Chase, Legal Processes and National Culture, 5 Cardozo J.
Int'l & Comp. L. 1, 1-2 (1997) (arguing that "differences present formidable barriers"
and using the civil litigation rules of Germany as an example); Fontana, supra note 30,
at 616-17 (referring to the transplantation problem as a long featured debate); 0.
Kahn-Freund, On Uses and Misuses of Comparative Law, 37 Mod. L. Rev. 1, 7 (1974).
102. See supra notes 88-90 and accompanying text.
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materials will somehow bind the domestic court and poison local
doctrine.' 3 The implicit argument is that if one thinks of comparative
materials as simply a point of comparison, rather than precedent, then
transplantation concerns begin to diminish.
However, despite diminishing the transplantation problem,
confining the use of comparative materials to maintain a better
understanding of why the American constitutional tradition is unique
confines their use to a small area. This boundary has already been
breached, considering that in Lawrence, Justice Kennedy used
comparative materials to help justify a constitutional right, and in so
doing overruled an American constitutional precedent."°4 When
trying to address the transplantation problem more generally,
supporters state that "courts should be more aware that there are
important historical, cultural, and legal relationships between the
United States and other countries. . . ." 0I Additionally, as the United
States becomes more multicultural, links between the traditions and
cultures of other countries and the American fabric strengthen."6 To
some, these differences now only require "slightly different accents
and emphases, but they do not appear in any way to limit or control
the otherwise global scope of the discourse."1"7  Furthermore, the
supporter of comparative materials can argue that if one is troubled
by the transplantation problem, one should also be troubled by the
direct application of the intent of the founding generation as much as
by consideration of a recent case from the Supreme Court of Canada,
for instance.0 8 It is quite plausible that reference to American society
circa 1800 makes for a more distorted translation than would
reference to its constitutional neighbors today." 9 This reality has
helped contribute to the argument that most of American
103. See Harding, supra note 7, at 417 (noting that the use of comparative materials
does not require that they be followed or perceived to be binding).
104. See supra notes 1-2, 6 and accompanying text.
105. Fontana, supra note 30, at 550.
106. See id. at 573. For further discussion, see supra notes 84-87 and accompanying
text.
107. See Carozza, supra note 14, at 1078.
108. Canada's Charter of Rights and Freedoms was modeled closely after the U.S.
Bill of Rights, and it has been frequently interpreted over the last twenty years. See
Harding, supra note 7, at 414; supra note 53 (listing some freedoms secured by the
Canadian Charter). A lack of familiarity with the Founding Era is the basis for this
problem. See Caleb Nelson, Originalism and Interpretive Conventions, 70 U. Chi. L.
Rev. 519, 557 n.151 (2003) (discussing the possibility that the best use of the writings
of the founders is to acquaint the modern-day interpreter to the legal world of the
framing).
109. See, e.g., Konrad Zweigert & Hein Kotz, 1 Introduction to Comparative Law
15 (Tony Weir trans., 2d ed. 1987) (stating that comparativism offers "the opportunity
for finding the 'better solution' for [t]his time and place"); Fontana, supra note 30, at
566-72 (arguing that comparative materials provide an updated perspective and more
complete set of "data points," otherwise unavailable to the interpreter); see also
Lawrence Lessig, Fidelity in Translation, 71 Tex. L. Rev. 1165 (1993) (discussing the
difficulties inherent in translating across the ages from the present to the founding).
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constitutional interpretation has failed to account for far too many
variables already."' For instance, whatever peaceful aspirations the
founders may have had for the U.S. system of federalism ended with
the Civil War."' "One could argue that continuing to refer to the
Framers' intent in this regard is akin to studying the drawings and
notes of the architect for an edifice that collapsed long ago. ''1 2
Despite these concerns, however, reference to the framers' intent is
far from obsolete.1
1 3
The above material is a sample of the philosophic debate
surrounding the incorporation of comparative materials into U.S.
constitutional interpretation. It seems destined to continue with little
chance of coming to rest one way or the other. However, while the
debate continues, Part I.C will demonstrate that comparative
materials have arrived, in some capacity, in American constitutional
jurisprudence.
C. The Domestic Arrival of Comparative Materials
The unresolved philosophical issues burdening comparative
constitutional law create new issues in and of themselves. But in
order to explore these issues one must move past the threshold debate
without an adequate resolution to it. Even the most vocal critic
cannot deny that the use of comparative materials is growing: their
very presence moves the inquiry past the threshold debate of whether
comparative materials should be used, to the more pertinent question
of how they should be used.
Many of the Supreme Court's current Justices have spent some time
overseas engaging in the comparative discussions which tend to cause
so much controversy. "4 In front of his international brethren, Chief
Justice Rehnquist has taken a pro-comparativism position, despite
110. Fontana, supra note 30, at 570 (noting that "[c]onstitutional scholarship
focusing on the judiciary and on [textual] constitutional interpretation has failed to
sufficiently analyze important extralegal changes such as multiculturalism and
technological advancement"); see also Erwin N. Griswold, Foreword: Of Time and
Attitudes-Professor Hart and Judge Arnold, 74 Harv. L. Rev. 81, 81 (1960) (noting
that the Supreme Court is isolated and remote); Michael C. Dorf, Foreword: The
Limits of Socratic Deliberation, 112 Harv. L. Rev. 4, 4 (1998) (asserting that the Court
should not look backwards for "true" meanings but instead find "workable solutions
to the complex and rapidly changing legal problems of our age").
111. McCabe, supra note 79, at 546.
112. Id. (quoting Mark C. Gordon, Differing Paradigms, Similar Flaws:
Constructing a New Approach to Federalism in Congress and the Court, 14 Yale L. &
Pol'y Rev. 187, 188 (1996)).
113. See infra Part II.B.1 (asserting that original intent is very prevalent in
American constitutional jurisprudence and is widely regarded as a legitimate way to
interpret the Constitution).
114. See Fontana, supra note 30, at 548-49 (discussing Chief Justice Rehnquist and
Justices O'Connor and Breyer).
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objecting to it in at least one of his opinions.1 5 Further proof of this
slow shift in attitude can be observed in "a latent practice in American
constitutional adjudication: American judges have occasionally been
using, and should continue to use, comparative constitutional
law .. ,,.6 And, in light of a handful of comparative cases, it is
unclear that the U.S. Supreme Court militantly maintains the
isolationist philosophy ascribed to it by some commentators."I7
In 1997, in Raines v. Byrd,"8 the Court held that members of
Congress, although authorized by the Line Item Veto Act 19 to
challenge its constitutionality,12 ° lacked standing to do so.12 In so
holding, Chief Justice Rehnquist observed that "some European
constitutional courts operate under one or another variant of such a
regime. '  In Washington v. Glucksberg,123 the Court refused to
extend constitutional due process protections to physician-assisted
suicide.'24 In doing so, Chief Justice Rehnquist made extensive use of
115. Chief Justice Rehnquist, in his dissenting opinion, objected to the use of
comparative materials in Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 324-25 (2002), then made
the following remarks at a ceremony celebrating the fortieth anniversary of the
German Basic Law:
For nearly a century and a half, courts in the United States exercising the
power of judicial review had no precedents to look to save their own,
because our courts alone exercised this sort of authority. When many new
constitutional courts were created after the Second World War, these courts
naturally looked to the decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States,
among other sources, for developing their own law. But now that
constitutional law is solidly grounded in so many countries, it is time that the
United States courts begin looking to the decisions of other constitutional
courts to aid in their own deliberative process. The United States courts,
and legal scholarship in our country generally, have been somewhat laggard
in relying on comparative law and decisions of other countries. But I predict
that with so many thriving constitutional courts in the world today... that
approach will be changed in the near future.
William Rehnquist, Constitutional Courts-Comparative Remarks (1989), reprinted
in Germany and Its Basic Law: Past, Present, and Future-A German American
Symposium 411,412 (Paul Kirhchof & Donald P. Kommers eds., 1993).
116. Fontana, supra note 30, at 542. Fontana goes on to note, however, that they
have been used "in a certain kind of way." Id. For a further discussion of the effects
statements like this have caused, see infra Part I.D.2.
117. See, e.g., Blum, supra note 34 (noting some of the criticisms and the relative
unwillingness of the U.S. Supreme Court to use comparative materials despite
discussing Knight v. Florida, 528 U.S. 990, 995-98 (1999); Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811,
828 (1997); Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 732-34 (1997); and Culombe v.
Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568, 577-601 (1961), in all of which the Court used comparative
materials, although to varying degrees).
118. 521 U.S. at 811.
119. 2 U.S.C. §§ 691-692 (2000).
120. See id. § 692(a)(1).
121. Raines, 521 U.S. at 830.
122. Id. at 828.
123. 521 U.S. 702 (1997).
124. Id. at 728.
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comparative materials, discussing the experience of the Netherlands
to inform his own decision. 125
The Chief Justice is not alone in citing comparative sources. In
Knight v. Florida,26 Justice Breyer dissented from a denial of
certiorari. 127  The petitioner had claimed that excessive delay in
execution violated the Eighth Amendment's prohibition against cruel
and unusual punishment. 28 In arguing for certiorari, Justice Breyer
made extensive use of comparative materials in an attempt to show
that the topic of undue delay on death row is one which the U.S.
Supreme Court ought to address.
29
Another example of the U.S Supreme Court's use of these materials
can be found in Atkins v. Virginia, where the court held that execution
of mentally retarded criminals violates the Eighth Amendment of the
U.S. Constitution.30 In support of this holding, Justice Stevens noted
that "the world community" had condemned imposition of the death
penalty on mentally retarded offenders.' 3' This short list of examples
is not exhaustive, as the Supreme Court's periodic sampling of foreign
authority slowly builds. 13 2  Following suit recently, comparative
125. Id. at 734. Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote the following:
This concern [about the difficulty in policing physician-assisted suicide] is
further supported by evidence about the practice of euthanasia in the
Netherlands. The Dutch government's own study revealed that in 1990,
there were 2,300 cases of voluntary euthanasia (defined as "the deliberate
termination of another's life at his request"), 400 cases of assisted suicide,
and more than 1,000 cases of euthanasia without an explicit request. In
addition to these latter 1,000 cases, the study found an additional 4,941 cases
where physicians administered lethal morphine overdoses without the
patient's explicit consent.
Id. In addition, he had referred to Canada, Great Britain, New Zealand, and
Australia earlier in his opinion. See id. at 718 n.16.
126. 528 U.S. 990 (1999).
127. See id. at 993.
128. Id. (Justice Breyer referring to the delay as "astonishingly long").
129. Id. at 995-98. Justice Breyer cites Jamaica, India, Zimbabwe, and the
European Court of Human Rights for the proposition that undue delay on death row
violates human rights, and cites Canada and the United Nations Human Rights
Committee as opposition, in order to support granting certiorari. See id. at 995-96.
130. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 321 (2002).
131. Id. at 316 n.21. Interestingly, Chief Justice Rehnquist, after citing foreign
authority in both Raines and Glucksberg, spoke out against reference to it in Atkins.
See id. at 324-25 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) ("I fail to see, however, how the views
of other countries regarding the punishment of their citizens provide any support for
the Court's ultimate determination.")).
132. See, e.g., Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 389 (1989) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting) (arguing that nearly all of Western Europe has abolished the death
penalty, twenty-seven countries ignore it in practice, and sixty-five countries which
have capital punishment specifically prohibit the execution of juveniles); Culombe v.
Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568, 588-90 (1961) (distinguishing India and Scotland from the
United States, England, and Canada); Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 102-03 (1958)
(citing a United Nations survey of the laws of eighty-four nations and asserting that
"[t]he civilized nations of the world are in virtual unanimity"); Bunting v. Oregon, 243
U.S. 426, 439 (1917) (citing the average daily working times in Australia, Great
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references can now be found in the lower federal courts.'33 However,
as discussed below, this usage has yet to mature to a level comparable
to that of the global discourse.
D. Building a Rhetorical Asterisk'34
Both the Court and commentators have contributed to the
underlying notion that comparative materials, although mentioned,
have little or no influence in domestic constitutional jurisprudence.
1. The Supreme Court
Despite the slow accumulation of comparative references discussed
above, their character is more properly described as a "polite
reference," rather than persuasive authority.'35 The Justices seem
very tentative, despite some enthusiastic comments to the justices of
other nations, 136 about using comparative materials in any substantive
or substantial way. Instead of dissecting the reasoning of foreign
courts, a few commentators have noted that the U.S. Supreme Court
tends to treat the existence of international norms "merely as
empirically observable facts rather than expressions of considered
judgments."'' 37 Both Raines3' and Glucksberg3' provide examples of
Britain, Denmark, Norway, Sweden, France, Switzerland, Germany, Belgium, Italy,
Austria, and Russia). For further examples, see supra note 12.
133. See Fontana, supra note 30, at 549. For an example of such a case, see supra
note 7.
134. The term "rhetorical asterisk" is being used here to refer to the sum effect of
all the ways in which comparative materials tend to be tempered, whether structurally
within opinions, with no probative value disclaimers, or by advocating weak versions
of comparativism.
135. Harding, supra note 7, at 420. This characterization supports the notion that
the real difference between the United States and other nations in the comparative
law context is not in quantity of instances (though this continues to be a difference),
but in their quality. See supra Part I.A. For specific illustrations of such a minimal
usage, see, for example, Foster v. Florida, 537 U.S. 990, 991 (2002) (Breyer, J.,
dissenting from denial of certiorari); Nixon v. Shrink Missouri Gov't PAC, 528 U.S.
377, 403 (2000) (Breyer, J., concurring); El Al Israel Airlines v. Tsui Yuan Tseng, 525
U.S. 155, 176 (1999); Knight v. Florida, 528 U.S. 990, 996 (1999) (Breyer, J., dissenting
from denial of certiorari); Barclays Bank v. Franchise Tax Board, 512 U.S. 298, 324
n.22 (1994); and American Dredging Co. v. Miller, 510 U.S. 443, 466 (1994) (Kennedy,
J. dissenting).
136. See supra notes 114-15 and accompanying text.
137. Carozza, supra note 14, at 1086-87; see also Vicki C. Jackson, Narratives of
Federalism: Of Continuities and Comparative Constitutional Experience, 51 Duke L.J.
223, 247 (2001) ("Unlike the use of comparative experience in other nations'
constitutional courts ... references to foreign constitutional experience in the U.S.
Reports rarely concern the reasoning of other constitutional courts."); Christopher
McCrudden, A Common Law of Human Rights?: Transnational Judicial
Conversations on Constitutional Rights, 20 Oxford J. Legal Stud. 499, 526 (2000)
("Foreign law, including foreign judicial decisions, is currently interesting to US
courts, if at all, largely as data rather than as statements of legal or moral values in
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this treatment.1 4" Despite this limited use, the Justices have also found
it necessary at times to explicitly note that comparative materials have
little bearing on the result and are not binding. For instance, in
Knight, Justice Breyer used comparative materials extensively,141 only
to add that they are "useful even though not binding.,
142
Furthermore, at times only the most diligent of readers will even
discover the foreign reference. Atkins 43 provides the best example of
this:
In the main text of the opinion, the Court measures the existence of
a national consensus regarding the "evolving standards of decency"
that mark the progress of a maturing society. Only after reaching a
conclusion on the basis of legislative developments in the United
States does Justice Stevens add a long footnote to list "[a]dditional
evidence" providing "further support to our conclusion that there is
a consensus among those who have addressed the issue." There,
almost buried among the opinions of medical associations, religious
organizations, and general polling data is this single sentence:
"Moreover, within the world community, the imposition of the
death penalty for crimes committed by mentally retarded offenders
is overwhelmingly disapproved."1"
Finally, a few Justices completely reject any place for comparative
materials in domestic opinions and speak out against them even as
they are used. In Stanford v. Kentucky, Justice Scalia asserted that "it
is American conceptions of decency that are dispositive," and that the
Court's interpretive task was to decide what was "accepted among our
people. ' ' 4 ' Justice Thomas also seems to think that comparativism
has no place in domestic adjudication. In Foster v. Florida, he
asserted that "this Court's Eighth Amendment jurisprudence should
not impose foreign moods, fads, or fashions on Americans."
' 146
their own right."). For examples of U.S. cases using foreign law as such, see supra
note 132.
138. Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811 (1997).
139. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997).
140. See Blum, supra note 34, at 184-86, 187-92 (discussing in some detail the way
in which comparative materials were used in these two instances).
141. One commentator observed that in Justice Breyer's opinion, "[f]oreign
sources are the predominant authority cited." Id. at 180.
142. Knight v. Florida, 528 U.S. 990, 998 (1999) (Breyer, J., dissenting from denial
of certiorari).
143. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002).
144. Carozza, supra note 14, at 1032 (citing Atkins, 536 U.S. at 316 n.21).
145. Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 369 n.1 (1989). Justice Scalia has echoed
this sentiment a few times. See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 598 (2003)
(Scalia, J., dissenting); Atkins, 536 U.S. at 324-25 (joining Chief Justice Rehnquist);
Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 921 n.l (1997).
146. Foster v. Florida, 537 U.S. 990, 990 n. (2002). Justice Scalia quoted this
language in Lawrence. See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
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2. Commentators
The Justices are not alone in feeling the effects of the threshold
debate. Commentators also have burdened comparative materials
with various "asterisks," in the form of cautionary disclaimers
reminding the reader of the limited authority of comparative
materials, despite trying to lend them support.'47 Writers advocating
the use of comparative materials have constructed sets of limitations
on them, possibly as a defense mechanism to deflect objections. 148
Whether sketching a framework of "refined comparativism" 149 or
making fairly tenuous connections to theories of the Constitution,50
by the time some commentators have justified the appearance of
comparative materials, they have considerably diminished their role as
a method of interpretation. 51 One such example goes to great lengths
to support comparativism, only to add the self-evident disclaimer that
it "should be viewed as a form of persuasive authority, or authority
that attracts adherence as opposed to obliging it."' 52 At least one
commentator has even suggested that the only thing which saves
comparative materials from their criticisms is their shortcomings.'53
Because comparative materials have "been used in constitutional
interpretation such that they are not central to any conclusions
reached, and that the resulting interpretation of the Constitution
could stand independently of foreign support," they can be
tolerated.154 And, despite their more prevalent use, it seems that some
commentators cling to isolationist conceptions of the Court, and
continue to note that "the U.S. Supreme Court rarely treats foreign
constitutional or other legal experience as relevant."'55 The threshold
debate seems to have caused great discomfort with comparative
147. See, e.g., Blum, supra note 34 (both arguing that comparative materials can be
used, but only if limited in one way or another); Fontana, supra note 30.
148. After sketching the threshold concerns, it has been the case that writers try to
show that the usage of comparative materials is sufficiently limited so as not to be
offensive to those who tend to believe that the American experience is unique. This
cautious endorsement is animated by the fear that any attempt to go straight through
the threshold debate will meet too many dissenters to gain acceptance. See Blum,
supra note 34, at 160; Fontana, supra note 30, at 556-74.
149. See Fontana, supra note 30.
150. See Tushnet, supra note 36.
151. See, e.g., Blum, supra note 34 (seemingly gutting comparative materials so as
to silence critics who would raise issues like the transplantation problem).
152. Fontana, supra note 30, at 557. At times, the Justices have also used language
like this. See supra notes 135-46 and accompanying text.
153. See Blum, supra note 34 (arguing throughout that the justification for the use
of comparative materials lies in their lack of probative value).
154. Id. at 171.
155. See Harding, supra note 7, at 421; see also Glen, supra note 19, at 287
(discussing an American legal implosion); Marian McKenna, Introduction: A Legacy
of Questions, in The Canadian and American Constitutions in Comparative
Perspective ix, xi (Marian C. McKenna ed., 1993) (noting that scholarship in the
United States continues to look inward).
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materials, and their use is likely to remain transparent so long as each
mention of them requires burdensome rhetoric to the effect that they
serve little purpose.
Therefore, despite their arrival in domestic opinions, comparative
materials carry with them a sort of rhetorical asterisk in the form of
various disclaimers or their structural usage in a particular opinion.156
This burden leaves their role in judicial opinions largely undefined
and marginalized. 1'57 The arrival of comparative materials then, is not
yet an arrival. As one commentator put it, any meaningful insight
from foreign materials remains "just beyond the current reach of U.S.
law."' 58 One very apt sentence by Professor Tushnet illustrates both
the problem, the rhetorical asterisk, and without being aware of it, its
solution: "[M]y claim is, in the end, rather modest: U.S. courts can
sometimes gain insights into the appropriate interpretation of the U.S.
Constitution by a cautious and careful analysis of constitutional
experience elsewhere.""' 9
II. A CONSTITUTIONAL STANDOFF: THE INTERPRETIVIST
SUPPLEMENTOR DIVIDE
Part I showed that while comparative references are on the rise, a
rhetorical asterisk burdens them and is preventing the United States
from enjoying the full breadth of the global discourse. This part
contextualizes the threshold debate via a brief discussion of the
American constitutional jurisprudence that provides the backdrop for
it.
As mentioned above, the threshold debate is cut along familiar
lines. 6' Methods of constitutional interpretation, and the proponents
of them, can, for the most part, be put into two categories:
interpretivists and supplementors. 161 To some extent, the Justices who
156. See supra note 142 and accompanying text (for an example of such a
disclaimer); supra notes 143-44 and accompanying text (for an example of such
structural usage).
157. While the Court has begun to use comparative materials, it continues to use
them in the ways described above. Compare supra Part I.D.1 (discussing the ways in
which comparative materials are used in the U.S.), with supra Part L.A (discussing the
richer global discourse). For a sampling of these cases, see supra notes 118-32 and
accompanying text. It has been suggested that perpetuating this is the inability of
American Constitutional scholarship to endorse the use of these materials in a more
unqualified way. See Fontana, supra note 30, at 545-46.
158. Carozza, supra note 14, at 1033.
159. Tushnet, supra note 36, at 1228 (emphasis added).
160. See supra notes 33-35 and accompanying text.
161. See, e.g., John Hart Ely, Democracy and Distrust 1 (1980) (mentioning the
"long-standing dispute in constitutional theory"); Michael Perry, The Constitution,
The Courts, and Human Rights 10-11 (1982) (discussing a distinction between
interpretive and non-interpretive (supplemental) review); Dorf supra note 110, at 4
(not using the term "supplementor" but expressing a similar categorical constitutional
divide); cf Richard Posner, Some Uses and Abuses of Economics in Law, 46 U. Chi.
L. Rev. 281, 285 (1979) (discussing the difference between positive and normative
1264 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 73
have been most hostile to the use of comparative materials are those
who could be described as interpretivists. 162 The interpretivist is likely
to view the Constitution as positive law, and tends to rely very heavily
on the constitutional text and original understanding.'63 For others,
who could be referred to as supplementors, the Constitution is a
normative attempt to embody fundamental justice, to be interpreted
economic analyses of the law, which parallels interpretivists (positivist) and
supplementors (normative)).
162. See David Crump, How Do the Courts Really Discover Unenumerated
Fundamental Rights? Cataloguing the Methods of Judicial Alchemy, 19 Harv. J.L. &
Pub. Pol'y 795, 829 (1996) (describing the approach of the interpretivists and alluding
to their views on non-interpretivist methods). The school of constitutional
interpretation referred to as "interpretivists" privilege the text and the intent of the
founders. See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., A Constructivist Coherence Theory of
Constitutional Interpretation, 100 Harv. L. Rev. 1189, 1209-17 (1987); see also Raoul
Berger, Government by Judiciary: The Transformation of the Fourteenth
Amendment 363-72 (1977) (discussing why, in his view, the Constitution ought to be
"fixed" in time, and therefore the document and the original intention should be
paramount); Ely, supra note 161, at 1-9 (describing interpretivism); Perry, supra note
161, at 10-11 (calling interpretivism a theory which claims only interpretive judicial
review is legitimate, and all "non-interpretive" review is illegitimate); Robert Bork,
Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 Ind. L.J. 1, 11, 14 (1971)
(asserting that substantive due process is an "improper doctrine," because the Court
must decide on liberties without guidance from the text of the Constitution, and
attempting to formulate an original intent justification for Brown v. Board of
Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954)); Henry P. Monaghan, Our Perfect Constitution, 56
N.Y.U. L. Rev. 353, 374-76 (1981) (noting the tension between "perfectionists" and
interpretivists because perfectionists look to sources beyond the constitutional text
and original intent).
163. See Fallon, supra note 162, at 1232 (describing the positivist approach as one
of "disinterested social science," suggesting a more mechanical application of rules
and principles derived from the Constitution); see also Robert H. Bork, The
Impossibility of Finding Welfare Rights in the Constitution, 1979 Wash. U. L.Q. 695,
695 (1979) (representing the interpretivist school of thought as one which includes
textual analysis, including structural implications, and "historical discourse"). Not
surprisingly, supplemental methods of constitutional interpretation are criticized by
interpretivists as "nothing but results-oriented judicial creation, enabling the judge to
impose his idiosyncratic preferences as positive law." Crump, supra note 162, at 830.
At times the Justices assert interpretivist attitudes in the opinions themselves, in order
to justify avoiding making value-infused decisions. See, e.g., Harris v. McCrae, 448
U.S. 297, 326 (1980) (asserting that the lower courts exceeded their power in weighing
interests, as the role of the courts is limited to interpreting the Constitution);
Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726, 730-31 (1963) ("It is now settled that States 'have
power to legislate against what are found to be injurious practices in their internal
commercial and business affairs, so long as their laws do not run afoul of some
specific federal constitutional prohibition .... ' (citation omitted); Williamson v. Lee
Optical, Inc., 348 U.S. 483, 488 (1955) (asserting that the court will not strike down
unwise legislation with only the vague language of the Due Process Clause). Possibly
in an attempt to stigmatize methods that overtly reach past the text and original
intent, positivists have described other methods of constitutional interpretation with
the oxymoron, non-interpretivist interpretation. See Crump, supra note 162, at 829-30.
For further discussion of the interpretivist's perspective, see Berger, supra note 162;
Perry, supra note 161, at 10-11; and Bork, supra note 162.
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more broadly or abstractly." The roots of this dichotomy run right
down to the foundation of constitutional law.
165
With this dichotomy in mind, the comparative materials debate
might be just one more battlefield on which this larger war is being
fought. Therefore, the exchange discussed in Part I might be better
understood in the context of arguments for and against other and
better established methods of constitutional interpretation. To that
end, this part discusses such arguments in order to compare them in
Part III to those which burden comparative materials.
A. Textual Interpretation
1. The Interpretivists' Perspective
The interpretivists do not have to expend much effort justifying
their reliance on the constitutional text. So long as interpretivists are
able to base a decision on the text, their cries about the inferiority of
other methods seem to hold water.'66 Proponents of other methods of
164. See Fallon, supra note 162, at 1232 (suggesting the normative approach
concerns itself more with "ought"). This ought-oriented approach naturally lends
itself to a broader constitutional approach to effectuate not just correct, but also
desirable results. Supporters of normative conceptions of the Constitution might
reply to the originalists with the claim that while judicial abuse of extra-textual
methods is properly characterized as non-interpretivism, responsible use of them is
properly referred to as supplementation, and is necessary for a workable
constitutional regime. See Crump, supra note 162, at 831 (suggesting that while
supplementation is legitimate and indeed necessary, rejecting the view of a pure
interpretivist, a distinction between supplementation and non-interpretivism ought to
be preserved, "with the difference between the two being a matter of degree"); see
also Thomas C. Grey, The Constitution as Scripture, 37 Stan L. Rev. 1, 1-2 (1984)
(arguing that "we are all interpretivists," with the only question revolving around
whether and how much to supplement). For further articulation of this perspective,
including the assertion that the Constitution consists of abstract principles, see
Brennan, supra note 35; Ronald Dworkin, Life's Dominion 118-47 (1994).
165. Crump, supra note 162, at 829-30. Compare, e.g., Robert H. Bork, The
Tempting of America: The Political Seduction of the Law (1990) (advocating
interpretivist approaches), and Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U.
Cin. L. Rev. 849 (1989), with Dworkin, supra note 164, at 118-47 (also advocating
views which implicitly favor supplementation rather than narrow adherence to
original intent), and Brennan, supra note 35 (generally advocating the supplementor's
conception of the Constitution), and Grey, supra note 164, at 1-2 (arguing that
supplementation is also an interpretivist stance, the only difference being the degree
to which one supplements and when).
166. See Fallon, supra note 162, at 1195 (noting that "[w]here the text speaks
clearly and unambiguously.., its plain meaning is dispositive"). For further
examples, see Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24, 54-55 (1974); United States v.
Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 62-64 (1936); and Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat) 264, 381
(1821). See also Philip Bobbitt, Constitutional Fate 24-28 (1982); Michael J. Perry,
The Authority of Text, Tradition, and Reason: A Theory of Constitutional
'Interpretation,' 58 S. Cal. L. Rev. 551, 554, 591 (1985) (arguing that judges believe
they ought to maintain a connection to the constitutional text and that this textual
focus ought to be maintained); Fredrick Schauer, An Essay on Constitutional
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constitutional interpretation are unwilling to contest an interpretivist
on the claim that the text ought to be regarded as the primary
method. 67 And, naturally, interpretivists feel that as long as they stay
reasonably close to the constitutional text, they are a safe distance
from the judicial policymaking that they set out to avoid. 68
2. The Supplementors' Perspective
The supplementor 69 replies to the interpretivist's reliance on the
text not with fruitless arguments against its legitimacy, but with the
observation that "the text of the Constitution seems to matter more
for less important questions-seemingly an inversion of the way the
constitution should be interpreted."' 70 Supplementors seek to justify
the use of other methods of interpretation because the text simply
does not resolve many difficult constitutional questions. 7' This
problem is caused in part by the limitations of old language describing
Language, 29 UCLA L. Rev. 797, 798 (1979) (lamenting the fact that modern
interpreters tend to assume too quickly that the text provides no answer as they dive
into history, theory, philosophy, and policy). As another commentator put it, "[you
cannot make an argument for any constitutional principle without purporting to show,
at some point, that the principle is consistent with the text of the Constitution."
Strauss, supra note 39, at 1731. For a discussion of the relevance of the plain meaning
of words in legal interpretation, see generally Michael S. Moore, A Natural Law
Theory of Interpretation, 58 S. Cal. L. Rev. 279, 288-338 (1985).
167. John Hart Ely, for instance, would probably admit that his democratic
reinforcement theory cannot be dispositive if it flies in the face of specific text. See
Ely, supra note 161, at 4, 41 (discussing the danger of an anti-democratic body which
irreversibly invalidates legislation in the name of the Constitution without textual
support, and then asserting that his theory is primarily to define the text's "open-
ended provisions," not to trump specific ones).
168. Bork, supra note 165, at 145-53 (contending that interpretivism "is capable of
supplying neutrality" and voicing concerns that other approaches to interpretation are
not so restrained).
169. The term supplementation refers to what is sometimes called "non-
interpretivism." They allude to the same methods, but non-interpretivism carries with
it a sense of illegitimacy. See Crump, supra note 162, at 829. For a discussion of the
divide between interpretivists and supplementors, see supra notes 160-65 and
accompanying text.
170. Strauss, supra note 39, at 1740. Compare Bowshar v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714
(1986) (asking if the comptroller general can play a role in the implementation of
laws, and doing so with textual arguments), and Fed. Election Comm'n v. NRA
Political Victory Fund, 6 F.3d 821 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (inquiring into designation of
congressional employees and their status as ex-officio members of an agency
formalistically), with Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654 (1988) (inquiring into the
constitutionality of agencies generally and not using formalistic textual analysis). For
additional discussions, see Frank H. Easterbrook, The State of Madison's Vision of the
State: A Public Choice Perspective, 107 Harv. L. Rev 1328, 1340 (1994) (lamenting the
tendency of the court to provide formal, more textual analysis in insignificant cases,
and formless balancing in serious cases); and Pushaw, supra note 79, at 1187 (pointing
out that "[a]lthough Justice Scalia is the most famous ... textualist," he is unable to
remain true to "this approach because of practical judicial obligations").
171. Fallon, supra note 162, at 1196 (asserting that "the language of the
Constitution... resolves so few hard questions"); Strauss, supra note 39, at 1726.
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ideas to last through the centuries, a problem that was anticipated by
the framers:
Anti-Federalists complained that the Constitution's language was
ambiguous and obscure. The Constitution's supporters responded
that the document had been drafted with as much precision as
possible, but they acknowledged that some indeterminacy was
inevitable. In Federalist 37, James Madison argued that even
superhuman drafters could not have produced a perfectly precise
document, since "no language is so copious as to supply words and
phrases for every complex idea, or so correct as not to include many
equivocally denoting different ideas."... As Madison explained in
a later letter, the vocabulary that existed at the time of the framing
was geared to the "known ideas" of the day, but the framers were
trying to describe "new ideas"; such innovations "must be expressed
either by new words, or by old words with new definitions." Thus,
"[i]t... was foreseen at the birth of the Constitution, that difficulties
and differences of opinion might occasionally arise in expounding
terms and phrases necessarily used in such a charter .... 172
As a result, supplementors point out that textual interpretation
relies on other methods to pick up where the text leaves off.173
Another way to cope with this limitation is for an interpretivist to
make an argument in the name of the text that is actually based on
some type of broad structural inference. 74 Supplementors argue that
both of these maneuvers allow for the type of judicial policymaking
that interpretivists condemn. 175
172. Nelson, supra note 108, at 525-26; see also Ronald Dworkin, Taking Rights
Seriously 131-49 (1977) (observing that the drafters seem to have spoken at times in
general concepts, rather than specific conceptions); Murphy et al., supra note 54, at 8,
8-9 (discussing the fact that "[a]lthough many clauses of the constitutional text are
models of clarity and specificity, many others seem to invite debate"); Law and
Politics: Occasional Papers of Felix Frankfurter, 1913-1938, at 30 (E.F. Pritchard &
Archibald MacLeish eds., 1939) (asserting that many clauses of the Constitution
"leave the individual Justice free, if indeed they do not compel him, to gather
meaning, not from reading the Constitution, but from reading life").
173. As Professor Richard Fallon points out, the constitutional language will often
support multiple readings. "In such cases, nontextual factors may guide selection
among the plausible alternatives." Fallon, supra note 162, at 1254. For instance, the
phrase "cruel and unusual punishments" can hardly be interpreted without some
reference to history and value judgments. U.S. Const. amend. VIII.
174. See Crump, supra note 162, at 845. For an example of such an inference, see
Kramer v. Union Free School District, 395 U.S. 621, 626 (1969). For further
discussion, see Charles Black, Structure and Relationship in Constitutional Law
(1969).
175. See supra note 163.
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B. Original Intent
1. The Interpretivists' Perspective
Once again, the main hurdle of the interpretivist is not to justify the
usage of original intent, as it is generally regarded as legitimate in
constitutional adjudication. 7 6 To the interpretivist, reference to the
intent of the framers and ratifiers is part of what it means to be an
American.
177
But in light of the limitations of the text,178 the interpretivist relies
on original intent to provide flexibility in constitutional
interpretation. 179 To that end, interpretivists argue for "abstract" or
176. See Fallon, supra note 162, at 1244-45 (ranking original intent second in his
hierarchy and stating, "I know of no constitutional case in which the Supreme Court
has held that, although the framers' intent would require one result, another must be
upheld on some other ground"). Original intent is so well respected by judges, that at
times it is utilized even when the holding seems at variance with that intent, perhaps
in an effort to better justify a decision simply by its presence. See, e.g., Williams v.
Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 92-100 (1970) (discussing in detail the history of trial by jury, and
holding that the number twelve is not an indispensable part of the Sixth Amendment
despite some historical evidence to the contrary); Bell v. Maryland, 378 U.S. 226, 288-
312 (1964) (Goldberg, J., concurring) (discussing in great detail the original intent of
the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment). Interpretivists in particular tend to view
original intent as controlling, co-extensively with the text. See supra notes 162-63 and
accompanying text. However, other constitutional interpreters might entitle original
intent to some lesser amount of weight. See, e.g., Paul Brest, The Misconceived Quest
for the Original Understanding, 60 B.U. L. Rev. 204, 224, 229-34 (1980); Perry, supra
note 166, at 570 (asserting that "[t]o consult [original intent] is one thing, however; to
accord [it] authoritative status is something else"). Further still, a few commentators
suggest that original intent has no proper place in constitutional interpretation. See
Dworkin, Law's Empire, supra note 78, at 359-81; Fallon, supra note 162, at 1198
(noting that "several important scholars have recently argued that the intent of the
framers generally has no justifiable place in constitutional argument"); Terrance
Sandalow, Constitutional Interpretation, 79 Mich. L. Rev. 1033, 1062-64 (1981)
(discussing the problem that even the core of the framers' intent-which is difficult
for modern interpreters to ascertain in the first place-cannot remain constant, hence
complete allegiance to it can be questioned); Larry G. Simon, The Authority of the
Framers of the Constitution: Can Originalist Interpretation Be Justified?, 73 Cal. L.
Rev. 1482, 1482 (1985) (opening his article by asserting his "ambition to establish that
the intent of the framers, drafters, and adopters of the Constitution is not an
authoritative source for discovering the Constitution's meaning").
177. Professor Strauss writes: "Just as part of being an American is acknowledging
obligations of mutuality with others who live today, so part of being an American is to
maintain continuity with those earlier generations. One way we do that is to adhere,
at least to some degree, to their decisions on questions of constitutional law." Strauss,
supra note 39, at 1722-23 (emphasis added). This statement seems to suggest that
considering original intent is discretionary, just as use of comparative materials would
be. In addition, the italicized portion suggests that it is just as much a part of being an
American to respect the views of humanity generally, which would seem to weigh in
favor of the consideration of comparative materials. For further evidence in favor of
the proposition that it is becoming part of being an American to respect multinational
norms, see supra notes 78-87 and accompanying text.
178. See supra notes 170-72 and accompanying text.
179. See Nelson, supra note 108, at 538 (discussing the fact that the Constitution's
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"sophisticated" originalism, which they claim successfully applies the
general purposes of the founders to modern circumstances, rather
than being hung up on specific intents or expectations articulated at
the constitutional and ratifying conventions.' 80 They argue that this
amount of flexibility allows for an interpreter to be a committed
originalist while "other methods... elevate the idiosyncratic
preferences of unelected judges to the status of fundamental law.' 181
This flexibility, constrained by abstract notions of the framers'
scheme, is considered by the originalist as "the lesser evil" when
compared to the potential for judicial abuse found in methods of
interpretation which more openly call for normative value
judgments.182
2. The Supplementors' Perspective
In order to challenge the idea that the Constitution can be
adequately defined by the text and original intent alone"8 3 and
facilitate the acceptance of additional methods of constitutional
interpretation, supplementors reject the notion that originalism can be
stretched to cover all constitutional questions."8 As evidence of this,
provisions "lent themselves to a range of permissible interpretations"). However it
seems that Madison, at least, hoped that once the ambiguous clauses were given
meaning they would be settled. See id. at 538-39.
180. See, e.g., Crump, supra note 162, at 823-24; Fallon, supra note 162, at 1254-58
(using the terms "sophisticated" and "abstract," respectively); Michael J. Perry, The
Legitimacy of Particular Conceptions of Constitutional Interpretation, 77 Va. L. Rev.
669, 674-86 (1991) (discussing the theory developed by Robert H. Bork which he calls
sophisticated originalism, designed to provide greater flexibility to the interpretivist).
This practice of applying general schemes to modern problems provides the originalist
with a response to the critique that "the genius of the Constitution rests not in any
static meaning it might have had in a world that is dead and gone, but in the
adaptability of its great principles to cope with current problems and current needs."
Brennan, supra note 35, at 438. For a few other responses to Justice Brennan's
comment, see Crump, supra note 162, at 821-22.
181. Crump, supra note 162, at 821 (citing Berger, supra note 162, at 363-64, 407-08,
417-18; Robert Bork, Styles in Constitutional Theory, 26 S. Tex. L. Rev. 383 (1985);
Edwin Meese, III, The Supreme Court of the United States: Bulwark of a Limited
Constitution, 27 S. Tex. L. Rev. 455 (1985)); see also Bork, supra note 165, at 145
(referring to non-originalism as uncorrectable "re-writing of the Constitution").
182. See Scalia, supra note 165, at 862 (concluding that he prefers originalism as the
lesser evil after extensive discussion of its strengths and weaknesses relative to those
of other interpretive approaches).
183. Professor Strauss has noted that "[c]ritics have powerfully attacked the notion
that constitutional interpretation can rely exclusively on the text and the original
understandings .... " Strauss, supra note 39, at 1718. For the claim that these
methods are the only ones which are legitimate and should be used exclusively, see
Berger, supra note 162; Perry, supra note 161, at 10-11; Bork, supra note 162; and
Monaghan, supra note 162.
184. See, e.g., Brest, supra note 176, at 218-22 (discussing how difficult the
historian's task can be); James H. Hutson, The Creation of the Constitution: The
Integrity of the Documentary Record, 65 Tex. L. Rev. 1, 2 (1986) (beginning his
exploration of recently discovered historical documents by warning that there are
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they point out that originalism is not a major feature in much of
contemporary constitutional adjudication.'85 Aside from a simple
rejection of rule by the dead hand of the founders,'86 original intent is
constrained by holes in the historical records, 187 as well as evidence in
some cases that the founders themselves did not agree on the meaning
"problems with most of them and that some have been compromised"); Grant S.
Nelson & Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., Rethinking the Commerce Clause: Applying First
Principles to Uphold Federal Commercial Regulations but Preserve State Control Over
Social Issues, 85 Iowa L. Rev. 1, 8 n.33 (1999); Pushaw, supra note 79, at 1194-98
(offering a general critique of originalism); Robert J. Pushaw Jr. & Grant S. Nelson, A
Critique of the Narrow Interpretation of the Commerce Clause, 96 Nw. U. L. Rev. 695,
703 (2002) (asserting that the framers' intent "is often conflicting and misleading").
Of course, this statement is not peculiar to original intent. Some commentators seem
to believe that a pluralistic approach to constitutional interpretation is most proper,
which rules out the possibility that any method could be exclusive. See infra notes 240-
43 and accompanying text.
185. One commentator has noted that "as a descriptive theory of contemporary
constitutional interpretation, originalism fails spectacularly." Fallon, supra note 162,
at 1213.
186. Supplementors argue that "originalism was.., not the original
understanding." Laura Kalman, Border Patrol: Reflections on the Turn to History in
Legal Scholarship, 66 Fordham L. Rev. 87, 94 (1997). In fact, supplementors argue
that the founders expected something more akin to living constitutionalism. See
Nelson, supra note 108, at 524; H. Jefferson Powell, The Original Understanding of
Original Intent, 98 Harv. L. Rev. 885 (1985); Pushaw, supra note 79, at 1195 ("[M]any
framers themselves did not intend that their subjectively attached meaning would
control forever."). For instance, in a letter to Madison, Thomas Jefferson said "[t]he
earth belongs in usufruct to the living" and "[t]he question [w]hether one generation
of men has a right to bind another, seems never to have been started either on this or
our side of the water." Letter from Thomas Jefferson, to James Madison (Sept. 6,
1789), in 15 The Papers of Thomas Jefferson 392 (Julian P. Boyd & William H. Gains,
Jr. eds., 1958). After all, it is somewhat anti-democratic to allow a dead generation to
continue to rule. See Murphy et. al., supra note 54, at 45 (discussing the proposition
that in order to be subjects of the law, democratic populations should also be the
makers of it).
187. There are entire constitutional areas where there seems to be no original
intent to discover. See Ronald Dworkin, A Matter of Principle 38-57 (1985); Nelson,
supra note 108, at 544-45 (noting that the historical records on both the Necessary and
Proper Clause and on the Eighth Amendment's ban on cruel and unusual punishment
are indeterminate at best). But even when the founders did comment on a particular
provision, an originalist is faced with the challenge of constructing an authoritative
answer out of a group of intentions, expressed individually. See Dworkin, supra;
Fallon, supra note 162, at 1212. This concept of group intent is more difficult to
construct than the originalist would like to assert:
[L]egal texts are contingent, fragile, and ambiguous embodiments of
momentary political compromises in a rapid flux of perceptions that shift
with social actors' experiences and fortunes; that no sooner are words
launched upon the world in legal form than they help to set in motion
consequences that cause them to be reevaluated and reinterpreted. Once we
are presented with this fluid swirl of multiple, sharply contested and rapidly
refigured meanings, the notion that we can pluck one faction's construct
from a single instant in time, and pronounce it to be for all time, "The
Original Meaning" is made to look completely absurd.
Pushaw, supra note 79, at 1193-94 (quoting Robert W. Gordon, Foreword: The
Arrival of the Critical Historian, 49 Stan. L. Rev. 1023, 1027 (1997)).
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of a particular provision. 8 As a result, supplementors argue that
there are times when originalism, like the text, teaches contemporary
interpreters the core of a doctrine but fails to define its outer
reaches. 9
Furthermore, supplementors argue that even specific originalism
can be subject to abuse, as judges have at times given "law office
history" accounts of the founding, highlighting materials which point
to a result they find favorable. 9 But when originalists attempt to
augment originalism to condemn other methods, supplementors point
out that they are quite squarely confronting the policy choices that
they set out to avoid. 9' So while the interpretivist project is to avoid
judicial policymaking, 19 2 supplementors argue that abstract originalism
is a clever cover-up for exactly that.'93
C. Common Law Method
1. The Interpretivists' Perspective
While interpretivists vastly prefer a system of constitutional
interpretation which relies exclusively on the text and original
intent, 194 respect for the doctrine of stare decisis has led some to
propose a common law approach to constitutional adjudication.'
The interpretivists, however, are wary of the common law method
when doctrines develop in such a way that contemporary questions
188. At times, lack of a general agreement at the founding has led to a lack of
original meaning for subsequent courts to discover. See, e.g., Leonard W. Levy,
Original Intent and the Framers' Constitution 294-95 (1988); Nelson, supra note 108,
at 522.
189. Even originalists admit this and, in fact, this is when they move to abstract
originalism. See Bork, supra note 165, at 167-68.
190. See Pushaw, supra note 79, at 1191-94. The interpretivists' use of history
"seems to involve not an effort to reconstruct the climate of an earlier generation but
rather a picking and choosing of sources that will support a thesis that is arrived at for
other, normative reasons." Strauss, supra note 39, at 1748. For a thorough discussion
of the abuses of history in contemporary America, see Martin S. Flaherty, History
"Lite" in Modern American Constitutionalism, 95 Colum. L. Rev. 523, 523 (1995)
(opening his article by saying "Americans love to invoke history, but not necessarily
to learn it").
191. This is because, as Professor Fallon has observed, "there simply is no-value
neutral way to choose among possible specifications of the framers' abstract intent."
Fallon, supra note 162, at 1217.
192. For discussion of the interpretivist's distaste for any constitutional
interpretation that might facilitate judicial policymaking, see supra notes 162-63 and
accompanying text.
193. Fallon, supra note 162, at 1257 ("No result may be reached that is not
consistent at least with the framers' abstract intent.").
194. See supra notes 162-63.
195. See Strauss, supra note 39, at 1719 ("Much of American constitutional law
consists of precedents that have evolved in a common-law-like way, with a life and a
logic of their own.").
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come to look to precedent to the exclusion of the text or original
intent. 196 As opposed to common law areas of study like negligence or
adverse possession, constitutional interpretation requires constant
reference back to a fixed point of authority, namely the constitutional
text.197 Because these references are not always made, interpretivists
fear the common law method's ability to perpetuate constitutional
mistakes. 98
2. The Supplementors' Perspective
As interpretivists have come to accept the common law method,
supplementors renew their main critique of interpretivism: it is not
sufficient to cover complex constitutional questions. With respect to
the common law method, they assert that there are times when "no
controlling or even persuasive precedent can be found no matter how
broadly the existing decisional corpus is viewed."'199
Additionally, supplementors re-assert the complaint that while
interpretivists are claiming to avoid judicial policymaking, their
methodology nonetheless engages in it. 21°  While the common law
method claims consistency and a lack of judicial subjectivity, "some
judges and lawyers simply will 'see' or 'read' the cases differently." ''
196. For instance, in the area of freedom of speech, instead of turning to the text of
the First Amendment, if speech looks like incitement, one must apply Brandenburg v.
Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969); if defamatory, one turns to New York Times Co. v.
Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964); and if it appears to be obscene, the standard is Miller v.
California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973). Even the more narrow interpretivists have admitted to
conclusions based on case law, rather than the text or original understanding. See
Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 713 (1999) (Kennedy, J., joined by Rehnquist, C.J., and
O'Connor, Scalia, and Thomas, JJ.); Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 905 (1997)
(Scalia, J.); Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 54 (1996) (Rehnquist,
C.J., joined by O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas, JJ.).
197. The common law method "seems less suited to interpretation of a
Constitution, for which the text and history provide (relatively) fixed points of
authority." Crump, supra note 162, at 897. Therefore, precedent, while being a
legitimate factor in constitutional analysis, even to the interpretivist, should not bar
the way to contrary results. See Fallon, supra note 162, at 1262. "[S]tare decisis is
entitled to less weight in constitutional than in nonconstitutional cases, and the
Supreme Court stands ready to 'correct its errors even though of long standing."' Id.
at 1245; see also id. at 1261-62 (suggesting that had the Court not been able to break
from precedent so easily in constitutional law, the error of Lochner v. New York, 198
U.S. 45 (1905), would have been preserved pursuant to such a common law habit).
198. See Crump, supra note 162, at 896 (noting that "this approach can be
characterized as permitting the extension by one judge of another's constitutional
mistake"). To assume otherwise has been said to presuppose "a fanciful, even
romantic account of judicial capacities." Cass R. Sunstein & Adrian Vermeule,
Interpretation and Institutions, 101 Mich. L. Rev. 885, 891 (2003).
199. Fallon, supra note 162, at 1203 (quoting David L. Shapiro, In Defense of
Judicial Candor, 100 Harv. L. Rev. 731, 734 (1987)).
200. See supra notes 173-75 and accompanying text (regarding textual
interpretation); supra notes 190-93 and accompanying text (regarding original intent).
201. Fallon, supra note 162, at 1203; see also Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505
U.S. 833, 854-55 (1992) (discussing when a constitutional precedent ought to be
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But, more importantly, supplementors reply to interpretivist
objections to value arguments and the like with the claim that
applying precedent in constitutional cases requires interpretation of
past decisions and distinctions that are often riddled with judicial
policy choices.' 2 And supplementors argue that the common law
method might allow for taking the result of a particular precedent,
changing its rationale, and improperly claiming to be operating under
stare decisis, at a safe distance from judicial policymaking.2 3
D. Overt Supplementation
Over the objections of interpretivists, supplementors assert that
"[o]ne cannot adequately give meaning to the Constitution... merely
by reading its language and history. 2 4 Nor do they believe that the
limits of the constitutional mandate have been fully defined by
subsequent case law.205 Supplementors assert that the real substance
overturned, and identifying four factors that a particular Justice should consult, all of
which would seem to support reasonable differences of opinion). As these differences
could come out in good faith, consistency might be undermined without offending
sensitivity to judicial policymaking. Judges at times will simply "disagree as to what
constitutes permissible bases for distinction under the loose doctrine of precedent and
how much past decisions fairly could be claimed to establish under a broader
approach." Fallon, supra note 162, at 1203.
202. See Fallon, supra note 162, at 1207 (noting that "how a string of decisions
ought to be ordered into a pattern or subsumed under a theory, often will ... be
resolved on normative grounds"). In fact, "attention to value arguments frequently
will have a spillover effect into the precedential category." Id. at 1260; see also
Edward H. Levi, An Introduction to Legal Reasoning 1-4 (1949) (describing the
process of precedential application as a three-step process where the individual judges
have many subjective decisions to make); Karl N. Llewellyn, The Common Law
Tradition: Deciding Appeals 62-91 (1960) (discussing the flexibility inherent in
precedent and providing sixty-four examples of judicial treatment of precedent,
illustrating a wide spectrum of possible treatments); Max Radin, Case Law and Stare
Decisis: Concerning Prajudizienrecht in Amerika, 33 Colum. L. Rev. 199, 202-03
(1933) (discovering that precedent is an instrument capable of variation and
movement that is in ways not directly related to the precedent).
203. See Crump, supra note 162, at 897-98 (commenting that "[i]t... seems fair to
doubt an opinion, such as Roe, that relies on other opinions without explaining why it
does not accept their reasoning"). Interpretivists who do this can be criticized in a
manner similar to when they use law office history, abstract originalism, or textual
penumbras. For discussion of these problems, see supra notes 190 (law office
history), 191-93 (abstract originalism), 174 (textual penumbras) and accompanying
text. For an example of an instance where a Justice was accused of hiding behind
precedent while actually gutting the law which it stood for, see Casey, 505 U.S. at 953-
55 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (accusing the joint opinion of Justices O'Connor,
Kennedy, and Souter of changing the law while leaving precedent to exist only as "a
storefront on a western movie set exists").
204. Crump, supra note 162, at 829. For an example of the objections of an
interpretivist, see Bork, supra note 163, at 696 (asserting that use of supplemental
methods would "convert our government from one by representative assembly to one
by judiciary").
205. See supra note 199 and accompanying text.
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of the Supreme Court has opened up to a natural law approach. 26
When sources of positive law would point to more than one, or
perhaps a morally undesirable, result,27 "it is only reasonable for a
decision maker to employ moral and political criteria as grounds for
preference. ' 28 As a result, supplementors point out that most "hard
cases ' 2°9 as well as the most respected constitutional scholarship tend
to feature supplemental methods prominently. 10 While interpretivists
continue to insist that supplementation in any form is dangerous to a
written constitution, they are faced with the reply that it is both
"necessary and intended" as an ingredient in the American system of
interpretation.21'
With these being bedrock assumptions of the supplementors, the
project for such an interpreter might be described as one in which he
simply tries to distinguish between acceptable and necessary
supplementation and objectionable judicial policymaking, properly
considered non-interpretivism. 212  The legitimacy of these methods
206. "In form, the Supreme Court has adopted the [formalistic and positive] views
of Justice Iredell .... In substance, however, the [normative] beliefs of Justice Chase
have prevailed as the Court continually has expanded its basis for reviewing the acts
of other branches of government." John E. Nowak & Ronald D. Rotunda,
Constitutional Law 352 (4th ed. 1991). Some commentators have argued that rather
than attempting to hide supplementation, "courts have certain capacities for dealing
with matters of principle that legislatures and executives do not possess" and should
not be afraid to make value judgments more openly. Alexander M. Bickel, The Least
Dangerous Branch 25-26 (1962).
207. One of the great difficulties of being a pure interpretivist is the inability to
justify the result of a case like Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954). See
Crump, supra note 162, at 835-36. For such an attempt, see Michael W. McConnell,
Originalism and the Desegregation Decisions, 81 Va. L. Rev. 947, 1140 (1995).
208. Fallon, supra note 162, at 1268.
209. This term is now generally used to refer to constitutional cases which are not
easily resolved one way or the other through the more conventional and well-
established methods of constitutional interpretation. See Ronald Dworkin, Hard
Cases, 88 Harv. L. Rev. 1057 (1975); see also Black, supra note 81, at 1111 (indicating
the presence of supplemental methods in U.S. constitutional adjudication by asserting
"[tihe fact that the right to a decent livelihood is not named [in the Constitution]
cannot be a valid objection, unless we are prepared to rewrite our constitutional
law").
210. See Laurence E. Wiseman, The New Supreme Court Commentators: The
Principled, the Political, and the Philosophical, 10 Hastings Const. L.Q. 315 (1983)
(surveying constitutional scholarship which tended to feature value arguments
prominently).
211. Crump, supra note 162, at 837. For further discussion, see generally
Commentary on Constitutional Positivism, 25 Conn. L. Rev. 831 (1993); Natural Law
Symposium, 38 Clev. St. L. Rev. 1 (1990); Symposium, Perspectives on Natural Law,
61 U. Cin. L. Rev. 1 (1992); Symposium on Law and Philosophy, 12 Harv. J.L. & Pub.
Pol'y. 611 (1989). But see Scalia, supra note 165, at 856-62 (acknowledging some of
interpretivism's weaknesses but finally contending that its weaknesses represent the
lesser evil).
212. Some commentators are beginning to reject altogether any categorical
distinction, arguing instead that the difference is merely a matter of degree. See Grey,
supra note 164, at 1-2.
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then might hinge on their ability to prove useful to the constitutional
project while feasibly claiming to provide mechanisms for judicial
restraint.
1. Process-Based Interpretation
John Hart Ely, the proponent of the best known process-oriented
theory, believed that if courts focused on "reinforcing" representation
in the political process, their actions would reinforce democracy and
would be consistent with the Constitution."3 Simultaneously, he
rejected any role for value arguments based on substantive rights,
interests, or outcomes. 214 Phrased in these terms, Ely presented his
method as one which necessarily goes beyond the text, but
nevertheless geared it towards restraint on judicial decision making.25
Ultimately, he claimed a "value-neutral" way to make decisions on
the text's open-ended provisions.216 However, at least one famous
interpretivist argued that Ely is "a non-interpretivist whether he
knows it or not., 217 The assertion that the Constitution "should be
read to thwart majoritarian outcomes only when necessary to advance
process values is itself based on a substantive value choice about
which constitutional values should be paramount. '218 Simply put, the
threshold decision required by Ely's methods is one which
substantively values certain processes over others, and also values
process over other considerations.219 Therefore, this method has been
213. See Ely, supra note 161; see also United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304
U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938) (discussing the need for judicial intervention when the
political process is hindered or when it repeatedly disadvantages "discrete and insular
minorities").
214. Ely, supra note 161, at 43-72.
215. Id. at 41 (asserting that non-interpretivism failed to define the text's open-
ended provisions without improperly augmenting the judicial role, and that the
approach of the interpretivist, judicial abstinence, can be improved upon, in order to
set up the claim that his theory finds a better middle ground).
216. See id. at 70 (asserting that "the fundamental value theorists" failed in an
attempt to provide value-neutral methodology to define the text's open-ended
provisions); see also id. at 73-104 (first reconceptualizing the work of the Warren
Court around protecting process, not making outright value choices, then presenting
his theory in detail as one somewhere between interpretivism and non-
interpretivism).
217. Bork, supra note 181, at 390; see also Frank I. Michelman, Welfare Rights in a
Constitutional Democracy, 1979 Wash. U. L.Q. 659, 670 (questioning on what basis
judges can ascertain what constitutes impermissible process breakdowns if not the
"impermissibly subjective search for 'fundamental' interests").
218. Fallon, supra note 162, at 1220 (citation omitted).
219. Furthermore, maintaining a distinction between substantive values and
process becomes untenable, and "arguments about substantive values inevitably creep
into the constitutional calculus." Id. at 1221. For instance, moral judgments which
minorities would tend to find repugnant are fine, so long as those minorities were not
prejudicially excluded from the legislative process which gave rise to those moral
judgments. However, the theory does not guide the distinction between permissible
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criticized because it hides its value choices under the rug of a false
process/substantive value dichotomy. 2
0
2. History and Tradition
Another, and perhaps the most common of all supplemental
methods of interpretation, is the recognition of history and
tradition.22 1  More so than process-oriented approaches and value
judgments, the history and tradition approach does seem successful in
its attempt to supplement without great potential for judicial abuse.222
However, its strength is also its greatest weakness, as it seems to be
"extending protection only to those interests that need it least," by
recognizing the interests that should be protected by asking which
ones are traditionally protected. 23  In order to extend the
constitutional usefulness of this method, it is suggested that judges
might begin to tinker with the domain of history and tradition. 24
3. Value Judgments
Finally, there are value judgments and society's sense of natural
law. Within this broad category lie considerations like philosophy and
economic theory.225 While other methods of supplementation claim
moral judgments as a result of the legislative process and impermissible prejudice
during it. See Laurence H. Tribe, Constitutional Choices 11-19 (1985).
220. See supra note 219 and accompanying text.
221. "This is the approach taken by most Justices who recognize the need for
supplementation.., but who value judicial restraint." Crump, supra note 162, at 860.
For instance, even Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Scalia have appeared to
acquiesce to this approach. See Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dept. of Health, 497 U.S. 261,
269 (1990); Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 124-26 (1989) (Scalia, J., plurality
opinion).
222. Crump, supra note 162, at 860 ("Unlike [other supplemental methods], which
arguably depend more heavily upon the judge's values, the history-and-tradition
approach demands that the judge consult an ostensibly objective source .... ).
223. Id. at 861. It can be argued that the interests which have been traditionally
protected need the least amount of constitutional support, as the democratic process
is likely to protect them. Justice Brennan voiced this complaint, arguing in Michael
H. that the Due Process Clause was being limited only to interests that were
"'traditionally protected by our society,"' and would therefore only protect interests
which were already protected. Michael H., 491 U.S. at 140 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
224. See Crump, supra note 162, at 862 (presenting the question of whether a judge
might begin to augment history and tradition by considering things like philosophic
essays, novels, and poetry). But see Bork, supra note 181, at 386-87 (criticizing the
notion that judges could derive supplementation from "the vision of the philosophers
and the poets"). A more interesting question is if the domain of history and tradition
ought to be augmented to include all of Western civilization. See supra note 6 and
accompanying text (using Western civilization as the relevant domain); infra notes
287-89 and accompanying text (discussing the ability of comparative materials to
widen the scope of this method).
225. See Sunstein & Vermeule, supra note 198, at 904 (observing that
"[p]hilosophy..., linguistics, and economics have all contributed to ever more refined
normative accounts of interpretation").
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some restraining mechanism,226 interpretivists tend to argue that if
nothing else, certainly value judgments go too far. "The focus on
contemporaneity contradicts the purpose of a written constitution,
and it removes all but the weakest of restraints upon judicial
activism. "227 After all, "[i]f the Constitution is whatever five justices
say it is, based on their own transient personal notions of morality and
sound policy, then there seems to be little point in having a
Constitution at all. '228  The reply from supplementors that the
Constitution can be viewed as a "living constitution" does not directly
address this criticism, but instead asserts that a written constitution
runs afoul of the true project.229
Despite clearly having tenuous (at best) footing in constitutional
adjudication, overt value arguments and the like eventually found
their way into opinions quite regularly, and the philosophical
objections to them began to fall on deaf ears.230 Of course, they
always had a home within the other methods of interpretation,23 ' but
"flushing moral judgments out into the open... invites judges to
confront the extent to which their views really are infused by moral
and political values and to assess arguments and evidence that their
beliefs may be mistaken., 23 2  In other words, value judgments may
have had a rhetorical asterisk analogous to that which comparative
materials seem to carry.233 Another possible explanation for this
226. See supra Parts II.D.1-2.
227. Crump, supra note 162, at 886. This is a common argument of the
interpretivist. See supra notes 162-63.
228. Pushaw, supra note 79, at 1205.
229. See Brennan, supra note 35, at 438 (arguing that the current Justices are forced
to read the Constitution as twentieth-century Americans).
230. See Fallon, supra note 162, at 1189-90 (listing "value arguments" as one of five
kinds of legitimate constitutional argument). For example, privacy is not mentioned
in the Constitution per se, but the court used value judgments (in part) to interpret
the liberty encompassed by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to
protect certain aspects of privacy or autonomy. See, e.g., Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78,
94-99 (1987); Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 684-86 (1977); Loving v.
Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 499-502 (1965)
(Harlan, J., concurring).
231. See supra notes 173-75, 187-93, 199-203 and accompanying text (describing the
recurring problem that almost all methods of constitutional interpretation leave
enough room for value judgments to slide in through the back door). But see Planned
Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992). Justice O'Connor, writing for the joint
opinion, properly admitted to her endeavor, rather than cloak these judgments in the
name of other methods, and wrote "[tihe inescapable fact is that adjudication of
substantive due process claims may call upon the Court in interpreting the
Constitution to exercise that same capacity which by tradition courts always have
exercised: reasoned judgment." Id. at 849.
232. Fallon, supra note 162, at 1268; see also supra note 231 (using the example of
Justice O'Connor's opinion in Casey); Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 97 (1968)
(admitting that the federal standing doctrine contains both "constitutional
requirements and policy considerations").
233. Cf supra Parts I.C-D (describing the arrival of comparative materials as well
as the rhetorical asterisk which burdens them).
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eventual incorporation is the fact that in hard cases, where more well-
founded methods yield few answers, "[c]hecking particularistic
judgments against other indicators of moral and political insight can
only enrich the process of decision. "234 Professor Richard Fallon
contends that while they clearly and correctly carry the least amount
of independent probative value, as all of the easy cases got answered,
value judgments became a necessary tool, and somewhere on this
journey this need helped to legitimize them.2 35 As the threshold
debate continues and the number of comparative citations increases
nonetheless, it appears that history is repeating itself.
2 36
Part III of this Note asserts that the potential utility of the use of
comparative materials is no more outweighed by the criticisms
discussed in Part .B than the methods discussed above are
outweighed by their own criticisms.
III. A FRESH PERSPECTIVE: CONTEXTUALIZING THE THRESHOLD
DEBATE
The aim of this part is not to articulate a justification for the use of
comparative materials. It is instead to look at the perspective from
which they tend to be approached, and identify one which has been
somewhat overlooked. This new perspective might have been unable
to answer questions that revolved around whether we should use
comparative materials, but it might help answer questions regarding
how they are used. Part III.A discusses the perspective from which
comparative materials tend to be viewed. Part III.B looks to
comparative materials comparatively, rather than on their own terms,
in an effort to shed light on the assertion that they are no more flawed
than several accepted secondary sources of constitutional law.
A. Old Perspectives on Comparative Law
Theories of the Constitution have played a crucial role in academic
debate237-so crucial, in fact, that supplemental methods could appear
234. Fallon, supra note 162, at 1263.
235. See id. at 1264 (describing value judgments as occupying the lowest rung on
the hierarchal ladder, but also asserting that they tend to influence the vast majority
of cases anyway).
236. See supra Part I.C (discussing the arrival of comparative materials in domestic
decisions despite no real resolution of the threshold debate).
237. See, e.g., Fallon, supra note 78. Various constitutional theories are evident in
the following: Berger, supra note 162; Bickel, supra note 206; Philip Bobbitt,
Constitutional Interpretation (1991); Bork, supra note 165; Jesse H. Choper, Judicial
Review and the National Political Process (1980); Dworkin, Freedom's Law, supra
note 78; Dworkin, Law's Empire, supra note 78; Ely, supra note 161; Richard A.
Epstein, Takings: Private Property, and the Power of Eminent Domain (1985); David
A.J. Richards, Toleration and the Constitution (1986); Cass R. Sunstein, The Partial
Constitution (1993); Laurence H. Tribe & Michael C. Dorf, On Reading the
Constitution (1991); Harry H. Wellington, Interpreting the Constitution: The
1278 [Vol. 73
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illegitimate without some constitutional theory to support them. 238 As
a result, several arguments supporting comparative materials have
consisted of efforts to justify them in terms of broad theories of the
Constitution with which they seem to be compatible.239
For the sake of comparative materials, the positive aspect of this
perspective is that it facilitates a plurality approach to constitutional
interpretation. 24" Given that academics have wide latitude in
formulating many constitutional theories, it follows that any number
of methods of interpretation could eventually be justified in terms of
those theories.24' Such a dynamic leads to an open-door system for
interpreters willing to go beyond the supplementation barrier.242 At
Supreme Court and the Process of Adjudication (1990); and Frank Michelman, Law's
Republic, 97 Yale L.J. 1493, 1520 (1988).
238. See Fallon, supra note 162, at 1201 (asserting that "[a]t least after we have left
the domain of arguments from text, it is always necessary to formulate a theory about
a constitutional provision, or ascribe a purpose to it, before any 'derivation' of
particular conclusions can occur"); see also Murphy et. al., supra note 54, at 4 (noting
that the American constitutional text must refer the interpreter to political theories).
However, these theories are inadequate without concrete methods of interpretation
to carry them out, as theories are "'too vague to serve as rules of law' and 'their
effective implementation requires the crafting' of precise rules or doctrine." See
Choudhry, supra note 14, at 842-43 (quoting Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Foreword:
Implementing the Constitution, 111 Harv. L. Rev. 54, 60-61 (1997)).
239. See Choudhry, supra note 14, at 833-82 (discussing three theories of the
Constitution as an attempt to justify the use of comparative materials); Tushnet, supra
note 36, at 1238-1306 (same, albeit three different theories). One commentator went
so far as to say that comparative materials can be "justified no matter what theory of
constitutional law one may adopt or what school of contemporary constitutional
scholarship one may believe to be the proper methodology for studying American
constitutional law." Fontana, supra note 30, at 591.
240. At least one commentator has suggested that the founders intended for a
plurality of methods to be employed to interpret the Constitution, and cites the text's
open-ended clauses as evidence of this. See Nelson, supra note 108, at 525-29. Others
simply argue that "a pluralistic approach combining different methodologies is most
appropriate." Crump, supra note 162, at 804. One reason to be asserted for this is
that "the search for law is too important for any potential external source to be
eliminated a priori." Harding, supra note 7, at 438 (discussing Glen, supra note 19);
see also Murphy et. al., supra note 54, at 4-5 (noting that complexities make
constitutional interpretation arduous and controversial, and implying that it involves
much more than systematic application of rules).
241. The Court does not seem to be in the business of choosing "official" theories
of constitutional interpretation. See Fallon, supra note 78, at 574; Cass R. Sunstein,
Foreword: Leaving Things Undecided, 110 Harv. L. Rev. 4, 13 (1996) (pointing out
that the Supreme Court has never made an official choice among competing theories
and asserting that it is unlikely that the Court ever will do so).
242. For a discussion of the divide between "interpretivists," who would likely
reject the pluralistic approach, and supplementors, who would be more likely to
embrace it, see supra Part II. See also Choudhry, supra note 14, at 839-41 (concluding
that constitutional adjudication properly draws from a number of different sources
and a number of different interpretive styles); Crump, supra note 162, at 912-16
(arguing for a pluralistic approach in the specific context of the Due Process Clause);
Fallon, supra note 162, at 1189-90 (recognizing at least five kinds of constitutional
argument). Against this inclusory backdrop, it seems an anomaly that comparative
materials would be singled out for exclusion. This can be observed in Justice Scalia's
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least to the supplementor, these constitutional teammates
complement each other for a more comprehensive constitutional
243regime.
The problem with theoretical justification of comparative materials
is that while it may lead to the appearance of comparative materials, it
does not seem to improve their standing relative to other methods of
interpretation. 244  Now that comparative materials have arrived in
some capacity, one can turn to other methods of interpretation to
query if the lesser capacity in which they have arrived is justified.245
But before turning to the specific methods, it is important to note that
the entire system of constitutional interpretation is an inexact
science.246 Therefore, the vigor with which comparative materials are
jurisprudence. See McCabe, supra note 79, at 542. In Printz v. United States, 521 U.S.
898, 957 n.18 (1997), Justice Stevens, in his dissent, criticized Justice Scalia for relying
on speculation found in legal literature while rejecting the reasoned judgments of
foreign tribunals.
243. Several constitutional doctrines owe their breadth to several interpretive
methodologies. See e.g., Crump, supra note 162, at 837-38 (discussing the desirability
of a plurality approach in substantive due process jurisprudence while rejecting the
idea of Robert H. Bork, supra note 181, at 387-88, that any supplemental method is
inherently nihilistic); Pushaw, supra note 79, at 1186-87 (noting that "current
textualist and originalist approaches would require tearing down the entire existing
structure of Commerce Clause legislation and jurisprudence; adherence to precedent
would preserve certain fundamental errors in judicial reasoning; and the notion of a
living Constitution would discard our entire past to the shifting winds of politics").
Professor David Crump asserts that rather than compete with each other these
methods complement each other. One example he cites is Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113,
152-53 (1973), in which the court uses three of the methods he discusses: ordered
liberty, importance to the individual, and derivation from precedent (common law).
Crump, supra note 162, at 839. In addition, Professor Fallon's coherence theory
includes an assertion that in most cases, all methods of interpretation will work
together to justify a single result. See Fallon, supra note 162, at 1240-43.
244. See supra Part I.D (constructing the rhetorical asterisk by showing that
comparative materials are used only when they are very carefully limited). Efforts to
add comparative materials to a pluralistic approach to constitutional interpretation
through vertical justification can become counterproductive by adding to the
rhetorical asterisk. Compare Fontana, supra note 30 (attempting to support
comparative materials, while basing his justification on a limitation he calls "refined
comparativism" which essentially justifies them in terms of the very limited use that
they have), with Choudhry, supra note 14 (supporting comparative materials in terms
of three constitutional theories and also not adding to rhetoric which would tend to
limit their use).
245. For a similar perspective in the area of copyright law, see generally Lemley &
Volokh, supra note 13.
246. It is hard to assert that the system which gave us the fundamental rights to jog
topless and to use a gasoline leaf blower is flawless. See Crump, supra note 162, at
798-99. He goes on to state that "[r]ecognition of these 'rights' denigrates the
Constitution because it unnecessarily countermands the democracy that the
Constitution establishes." Id. at 799; see also David Crump et al., Cases and Materials
on Constitutional Law 12-14 (2d ed. 1993) (providing the Madisonian dilemma as one
problem with the American constitutional order); Steven P. Croley, The Majoritarian
Difficulty: Elective Judiciaries and the Rule of Law, 62 U. Chi. L. Rev. 689 (1995)
(same). Constitutional judgments have often been questioned. See, e.g., Washington
v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 228 (1990) (holding that prisoners may be forced to ingest
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guarded against might be irrational, at least to an interpreter who
favors a pluralistic approach. Perhaps viewing them with respect to
the other methods, and in the context of the perpetual tensions
between interpretivism and supplementation, will expose this
irrationality.
B. A Comparative Analysis of Comparative Materials
1. Transplantation Problem
The foremost pragmatic hurdle for comparative materials to clear is
the concern for the effects of institutional and cultural differences
between legal systems.247 But if it is a sufficient concern to contribute
to a long-standing rhetorical asterisk,248 then why is the same not
attached to the text or original intent? Recall the comments of
Madison regarding the language of the Constitution.2 49  If one is
applying the text of the Constitution, one ought to wonder which is
more troublesome: transplantation of language across very similar
legal systems with the same roots in a common era, 25 or the
transplantation of language across the ages.251
Or, in the alternative, with respect to original intent and the
respective legal contexts, consider the supplementor's arguments
regarding the difficulty in ascertaining group intent,252 or the
detachment many contemporary Americans might feel toward the
founding generation that is cited in response to legal
exceptionalism. 253 The differences between the legal world of 2004
certain drugs against their will); Andrews v. Ballard, 498 F. Supp. 1038, 1048-51 (S.D.
Tex. 1980) (holding that a person has a constitutional right to obtain acupuncture
treatment); Ravin v. State, 537 P.2d 494, 502, 504, 511 (Alaska 1975) (holding that
while there is no fundamental federal constitutional right to ingest marijuana, there is
a state constitutional right protecting its use in the home).
247. See supra Part I.B (discussing the transplantation problem within the context
of the threshold debate).
248. See supra Part I.D (discussing the way in which both judges and commentators
have "asterisked" comparative materials).
249. See supra text accompanying note 172.
250. Because most of the countries which actively participate in the constitutional
discourse have modeled their constitutions after the U.S. Constitution, those
constitutions might be said to have the same roots. The similarity in the wording of
the texts is most important for the purposes of transplantation. The European
Convention on Human Rights, for instance, protects many rights phrased nearly
identically to the U.S. Bill of Rights. See Jean-Paul Costa, The European Court of
Human Rights and Its Recent Case Law, 38 Tex. Int'l L.J. 455, 460 (2003); see also
supra note 53 (pointing out that the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms is
similarly worded to the U.S. Constitution's Bill of Rights).
251. Some argue that in applying the constitutional text, an interpreter must apply
contemporary meanings. See Bobbitt, supra note 166, at 25-26; Perry, supra note 166,
at 564-65.
252. See supra notes 187-89 and accompanying text.
253. See supra notes 85-86 and accompanying text.
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and the legal world of the framing might be significant enough for
concerns of the same order as the comparative materials
transplantation concern.2 14  "It is arrogant to pretend that from our
vantage we can gauge accurately the intent of the Framers on
application of principle to specific, contemporary questions. 255 While
concerns about transplanting legal arguments from one nation to
another are legitimate, perhaps concerns about transplanting them
through the ages are also.256 After all, the "present day United States
obviously resembles late-twentieth-century Canada more closely than
it resembles nineteenth-century America., 257  It is ironic that the
interpretivists' most familiar complaint against comparativism can be
effectively made against their own preferred methods of
interpretation.
2. Concerns About Judicial Policymaking
Perhaps the greatest concern of the interpretivists is judicial
policymaking, 29  and even supplementors admit that while
supplemental methods are necessary, they must be somehow
restrained to provide checks on the idiosyncratic preferences of
individual Justices. 260  Toward that end, they challenged the
interpretivists' term, non-interpretivism, and instead distinguished
between permissible supplementation and non-interpretivism.261
Comparativism is particularly suited to maintain this distinction, in
some respects more so than other methods,262 for two reasons.
254. See Nelson, supra note 108, at 557 (noting contemporary society's "relative
unfamiliarity with the legal world of the framing").
255. Brennan, supra note 35, at 435.
256. See Strauss, supra note 39, at 1738 (noting that the circumstances of other
modern day countries probably resemble current American conditions better than the
circumstances surrounding the founding).
257. Id. One might guess that the distortion which Professor Strauss speaks of only
increases as one moves further back in time.
258. Professor Strauss does not imply that those materials should weigh more
heavily in current U.S. jurisprudence simply because Canada today is a closer relative
to the United States today than the United States circa 1800. Id. He suggests only
that originalism is not justified by its great wisdom, nor by some peculiar applicability
to current United States conditions. See id.
259. See supra notes 162-63 and accompanying text; see also Bork, supra note 163,
at 695-96 (voicing his objection to welfare rights theories, which offer inadequate
guidelines on judicial policymaking).
260. See Michelman, supra note 217, at 674 (discussing the tension between the
Constitution mandating recognition of transtextual rights and the search for the
restrained approach to judicial enforcement that our representative democracy
demands); supra note 164.
261. See supra note 164 (discussing the goal of the supplementor in maintaining a
distinction between supplementation and non-interpretivism).
262. A few commentators have suggested, however, that comparative materials are
also subject to manipulation. See Blum, supra note 34, at 195-97 (arguing that Justice
Scalia's inconsistent attitudes towards comparative materials in Printz and Glucksberg
stem from the way they are used, though the reader is likely to notice that they simply
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First, comparative materials might be less manipulable than some
other supplemental methods because they often are limited to the
reasoned words of learned judges solving constitutional issues.263 The
claim that supplementation is not synonymous with non-
interpretivism needs to be re-asserted with each application of a
supplemental method of interpretation. Recall the problem of judicial
subjectivity when a judge decides how to treat a line of constitutional
precedent, 4 or when John Hart Ely decides that certain processes are
to be valued higher than others, and process in general is to be
preferred to other, more substantive values.265 Similarly, one could
(and probably will) argue that the threshold step in applying
comparative materials, deciding which other nations are similar
enough in whichever respects a particular judge deems relevant, is
also necessarily subjective and value-laden.266  However,
comparativism's threshold subjectivity reads right on the face of a
learned judgment, and when carefully limited to foreign constitutions
which are similarly worded to the U.S. Constitution, a comparativist
can argue, quite reasonably, that they are merely looking to pre-
packaged interpretations of the language they are charged with
defining, for the sake of considering more possibilities and limitations
weigh for him in Glucksberg and against him in Printz); McCabe, supra note 79, at
553 (noting that Justice Scalia has used comparative materials himself on many
occasions (despite his objections to them in cases like Lawrence), advancing the
conclusion that his objections in Printz were results-oriented); see also Choudhry,
supra note 14, at 892 (asserting her belief that "courts will not look to foreign
jurisprudence with which they disagree on a substantive level"). However, this
concern is a thread that runs all the way through the interpretivist/supplementor
divide, and is beginning to be regarded as unavoidable. "The Supreme Court Justices
[are] unconstrained and therefore decide[] cases as an imposition of will, an exercise
in power." Stephen M. Feldman, History and Interpretation, 38 Tulsa L. Rev. 595, 604
(2000) (discussing the conclusion of Sanford Levinson, Law as Literature, 60 Tex. L.
Rev. 373 (1982)). These concerns have contributed to a somewhat defensive position
by the Court itself, as at times the Justices themselves assert that value judgments are
not the province of the Court, and that they are merely applying the law, and the like.
See, e.g., Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 326 (1980); Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726,
730-32 (1963); Williamson v. Lee Optical, Inc., 348 U.S. 483, 488 (1955); Olsen v.
Nebraska ex rel. W. Reference & Bond Ass'n, Inc., 313 U.S. 236, 246-47 (1941). But
see supra note 232 (citing two examples of cases where the Justices openly confronted
the need for value judgments). For further discussion of how this concern seems to
play out in all methods of constitutional interpretation, see supra Part II.
263. Despite this valuable check on comparative materials, value judgments have
gained far wider acceptance in domestic constitutional adjudication. See Fallon, supra
note 162, at 1189-90. Interestingly, value judgments are justified by Professor Fallon
by their prominence in most modern scholarship. See id. at 1204. For a survey of
value judgments in modern scholarship, see Wiseman, supra note 210. The same
argument gets comparative materials past the threshold debate, but as of yet has not
been able to openly label them as legitimate. Perhaps this is just a function of time
and frequency.
264. See supra notes 200-03 and accompanying text.
265. See supra Part II.D.1.
266. See supra notes 21-23 and accompanying text.
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inherent in that language.267 Therefore, it appears no more value-
laden than judicial treatment of domestic case law, and does not hide
its value judgments like Ely's process-based theory might, under the
rug of a false procedural/substantive value dichotomy.26 8 Comparative
interpretation allows readers to see on the face of an opinion which
other nations are borrowed from, and to be able to assess for
themselves if these choices reflect values that should be taken into
account in domestic constitutional interpretation.
Second, concern for the risk of judicial activism is also somewhat
muted in the comparative materials context because of the sensitivity
to the threshold debate. Even if their use does eventually become a
fully-legitimized method of constitutional interpretation, it would
probably remain too conspicuous to be used in the tacit manner which
things like value judgments tend to be used, under the guise of textual
penumbras, abstract originalism, or precedential synthesis. 69 In fact,
when a precedential approach to a constitutional issue is taken,
foreign cases might be a class of precedent which is far less susceptible
to the common law method problems, like perpetuating a
constitutional mistake or bypassing public justification for changes in
rationale or doctrine. 27" As the threshold controversy will force judges
to carefully explain just what (and how much) they are borrowing
from the foreign court, it is unlikely that the problem of borrowing
results without explanations of rationale would occur when foreign
case law is used.2 7' Similarly, the sensitivity to comparative materials
would tend to prevent foreign case law from detaching doctrine from
the text. 2  Quite to the contrary, distance from the body of domestic
267. For instance, while the Supreme Court of Canada is interpreting its own
Charter of Rights and Freedoms in the literal sense, the language is sufficiently
similar to assert that its interpretation speaks, to some degree, as an interpretation of
the U.S. Constitution. See supra note 53. For this reason, some Canadian
constitutional cases have included in-depth analyses of American constitutional law.
See e.g., The Queen v. Keegstra, [1990] S.C.R. 697 (Can.) (discussing American
fighting words doctrine); Morgentaler v. The Queen, [1988] S.C.R. 30 (Can.)
(discussing the right to privacy as it developed in the U.S.) (Canada).
268. See supra notes 219-20 and accompanying text (discussing the contention that
Ely's method hides its value judgments, but makes them nonetheless).
269. See supra notes 174-75 and accompanying text (discussing textual penumbras);
191-93 and accompanying text (discussing abstract or sophisticated originalism); 200-
03 and accompanying text (discussing precedential synthesis).
270. After several years of disclaiming comparative materials with rhetorical
asterisks, it would be less likely for them, rather than a broad structural inference, to
be used under the guise of text and carry too much weight. For further discussion of
the Justices' hesitant use of comparative materials, see supra Part I.D.1.
271. For a summary of this problem as it pertains to domestic constitutional case
law, see supra notes 200-03 and accompanying text.
272. See supra notes 196-98 and accompanying text.
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constitutional case law might actually help shed light on its mistakes
(rather than perpetuate them) and provide a catalyst for correction.273
Part II of this Note asserted that supplementors believe that going
beyond the constitutional text is a necessity,27 4 and that interpretivists
allow for a more disingenuous brand of judicial activism by denying it
while reading values into other methods.275 Furthermore, the greatest
tension between the two schools of interpretation is how to
appropriately balance flexibility with checks on judicial
policymaking. 6 Whether comparative materials provide a palatable
compromise between activism and utility is up for debate, but it is
important to note that it is the very same debate that surrounds other
methods, including original intent, and indeed sometimes even the
constitutional text.
3. Adding a Tool to the Plurality Approach
As has been discussed above, a supplementor is especially likely to
believe in a pluralistic approach to constitutional interpretation. 7  If
one accepts the argument that comparative materials pose no greater
risk of judicial activism than other methods, then adding comparative
materials as a useful tool to answer hard constitutional questions
seems legitimate. For instance, in hard cases, it was explained earlier
that the text seems to disappear.278 In fact, some say that in these
cases the primary use of the text is largely to narrow the range of
possible results, not to compel a particular answer.279 In such cases,
one must have recourse to non-textual factors to decide between these
plausible alternatives.2 °  In its rich global usage, comparative
273. Comparative case law can "be an aid in correcting, or balancing, that
inevitable subjectivity of the judges that is due to their being situated in a specific
historical and cultural context." Carozza, supra note 14, at 1065.
274. See supra notes 204-11 and accompanying text.
275. See supra notes 174-75 and accompanying text (discussing textual penumbras),
191-93 and accompanying text (discussing abstract or sophisticated originalism), 200-
03 and accompanying text (discussing precedential synthesis).
276. See supra note 164 (discussing the goal of maintaining some distinction
between supplementation and outright non-interpretivism).
277. See supra notes 204-11 and accompanying text (discussing the supplementor's
belief that the text and original intent do not address all constitutional issues), notes
240-43 and accompanying text (discussing the development of a plurality approach to
constitutional interpretation).
278. See supra notes 170-73 and accompanying text.
279. Fallon, supra note 162, at 1196 ("More commonly, arguments from the text
achieve the somewhat weaker but nontrivial result of excluding one or more positions
that might be argued for on nontextual grounds."); Schauer, supra note 166, at 828
("Constitutional language can tell us when we have gone too far without telling us
anything else.").
280. "[C]onstitutional language often will support or bear more than one reading.
In such cases, nontextual factors may guide selection among the plausible
alternatives." Fallon, supra note 162, at 1254; see also James Boyd White, Law as
Language: Reading Law and Reading Literature, 60 Tex. L. Rev. 415, 415 (1982)
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materials are also used simply to help define a list of possible results,
and not to dictate the correct one.28' Just as with the majority of
textual applications, other methods would be called upon to find or
justify the best domestic result. So despite being a non-dispositive,
persuasive authority, it will, in many cases, do as much work as the
constitutional text.
Another similarity between comparativism and textualism can be
observed in easy cases. In such cases, the text might provide its
interpreter with a pre-packaged answer to a question.2  These easy
answers are desirable in situations in which the result is not
particularly important and there is no need for a prolonged debate.283
Therefore, another way to explain the text's absence from the most
important decisions is to say that when an issue is of great social
concern, such that a prolonged debate is demanded, it can be read not
to cover the question.2 8 In much the same way, comparative
materials, because they tend to be reasoned judgments, can offer pre-
packaged suggestions for more trivial cases, to be easily applied, when
no other method offers such a convenient solution. And, when more
important cases come before the court, they can just as easily be
distinguished, read differently, or altogether ignored.285
In addition, comparative materials help fill in factual data when
such is called on by other methods. 286 Recall the problem that the
history and tradition approach, while being a well-restrained
supplemental method of interpretation, also seems only to protect
("[R]eading a legal text is often not so much reading for a single meaning as reading
for a range of possible meanings.").
281. See Carozza, supra note 14 (describing how other countries use comparative
materials to understand the possible approaches to a particular problem).
282. See Strauss, supra note 39, at 1731-35. Professor Strauss calls the text a
"particularly good focal point" from which to come to agreements about
constitutional questions when agreements are "especially valuable." Id. at 1734; cf.
Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393, 406 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)
("[I]n most matters it is more important that the applicable rule of law be settled than
that it be settled right.").
283. For instance, some may think that it would be better for the President's term
to be five years, and others three, but in this situation the quick resolution of the
question by the text is better than a prolonged debate on the topic. See Strauss, supra
note 39, at 1732.
284. The Constitution "uses language general enough not to force on a society
outcomes that are so unacceptable that they discredit the document." Id. at 1736. The
presence of general provisions in the Constitution to allow interpretive flexibility is
thought to be desirable by some commentators. See, e.g., Louis Michael Seidman,
"Great and Extraordinary Occasions": Developing Guidelines for Constitutional
Change 9-25 (1999).
285. Even in the richer global discourse, the constitutional courts of other nations
have often decided to distinguish the decisions of the comparative materials they
considered. See supra notes 20-26 and accompanying text.
286. This is the type of usage Justice Breyer argued for in his attempt to base a
license on need. See supra note 95 and accompanying text.
A SHEEP IN WOLF'S CLOTHING
rights which historically have been protected.287 In order to break the
circularity of this method of interpretation, comparative analysis,
among other things, has begun to surface more and more frequently
as the analysis shifts from our nation's history and tradition to the
history and tradition of this and other western civilizations. 8 Rather
than share a criticism with this well-accepted method, comparativism,
when used in conjunction with it, helps address its major shortcoming.
Earlier, this Note mentioned that if one compares the history of
value judgments in American constitutional jurisprudence to the
current progress of comparative materials, one sees history repeating
itself.8 9 This Note argued that what ultimately legitimized value
judgments was their wide applicability. Similarly, as the sophistication
of American constitutional offspring continues to grow, and the
international constitutional conversation becomes more vast and
diverse, comparativism might become a tool nearly as versatile as
value judgments.2 190 However, with a far more direct connection to
texts similar to the U.S. Constitution, perhaps comparativism should
be regarded as more probative than the arguably more subjective
notions of value, philosophy, or moral theory.
CONCLUSION
A commentator once described the endeavor of constitutional
interpretation as one of "multiple poles in a complex field of forces,
among which judges navigate and negotiate. ' 291  Several arguments
advocating the incorporation of comparative materials have been
geared towards adding them as another pole in that field.292 What has
been neglected is the fact that while this attempt was successful, albeit
slow to develop, 93 the pole which represents comparative materials
pulls with less force than all others. However, the analogous
arguments in the context of the interpretivist/supplementor debate
suggest that this is irrational. Recall the comment of Professor
Tushnet mentioned above: "U.S. courts can sometimes gain insights
into the appropriate interpretation of the U.S. Constitution by a
287. See supra Part II.D.2.
288. Lawrence is a good example of this shift. In assessing the proposed right to
privacy using the history and tradition approach, Justice Kennedy refers to the
relevant domain as "our Western civilization." Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 573
(2003).
289. See supra text accompanying note 236. Meanwhile, lack of a wide applicability
tends to be the major shortcoming of interpretivist approaches. See supra notes 204-11
and accompanying text.
290. See supra note 6 and accompanying text for an example of this usefulness.
291. Frank I. Michelman, A Constitutional Conversation with Professor Frank
Michelman, 11 S. Afr. J. Hum. Rts. 477, 483 (1995).
292. See Choudhry, supra note 14, at 840-41; Fontana, supra note 30, at 557 n.84.
293. See supra Part I.C (discussing examples of the arrival of comparative materials
into American constitutional jurisprudence).
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cautious and careful analysis of constitutional experience
elsewhere., 294 This statement illustrates an example of the rhetorical
asterisk,295 defined as language which disclaims or otherwise attempts
to reduce the impact of comparative materials, even as they are
applied or discussed. 96 As the tension between supplementors and
interpretivists shows, this "asterisk" could be applied to any method
as the two sides have been articulating arguments for and against
methods of interpretation all along. Therefore, Professor Tushnet's
statement is not incorrect, but instead proves too much. With the
threshold concerns and debate still not resolved adequately in the
minds of the opponents of comparative materials, there is a tendency
to point out that they are not perfect, even though the imperfections
of other methods do not seem so dispositive. Erasing these asterisks is
an end in and of itself. Some commentators seem to believe that
doing so will change little as far as doctrinal results go.297 But if
supplementors have been winning out, and a pluralistic approach to
American constitutional interpretation is a reality, it is less likely that
problems stem from the appearance of certain forbidden fruits than
from misunderstandings of relative probative weights and illusory
debates about constitutional legitimacy. Fears of illegitimacy might
cause judges to hold their rationales close to the vest and cloud
opinions. Dropping the asterisk could relieve them of this fear and
help foster clearer and richer opinions,298 which could be more
accurately scrutinized because the sources and weight of persuasive
authority would be more frankly recognized.
294. See supra note 159 (emphasis added).
295. See supra note 159 and accompanying text.
296. The language used by Professor Tushnet is more understated than other types
of asterisks. While admittedly to a lesser degree, the emphasized language does serve
to remind the reader that comparative materials are somehow a weaker method of
interpretation than others. For further discussion and harsher examples, see supra
Part I.D.2.
297. See, e.g., Tushnet, supra note 36, at 1230 (noting that "it would be quite
surprising to draw dramatically different conclusions" even with a greater
incorporation of comparative materials).
298. For a discussion of what might result from comparative materials shedding
their burden, see supra Part L.A (discussing the benefit that they have conferred on
many of the world's constitutional democracies).
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